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PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians,
Local 702 Welfare Fund;
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians,
Local 702 Pension Fund

Award

and
AFC Laboratories, Inc.

The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of Local 702 Welfare Fund and Local 702 Pension Fund; and AFC Laboratories, Inc
having failed to appear after due notice, makes the following
AWARD:
For the months of June, July and August, 1972 AFC
Laboratories, Inc , owes the Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians Local 702 Welfare Fund the sum of $3280.00,
For the months of June, July and August, 1972 AFC
Laboratories, Inc , owes the Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians Local 702 Pension Fund the sum of $3280.00,
Accordingly AFC Laboratories, Inc. is directed to make
payment of said sums to said Funds forthwith with interest, plus a penalty of 1% of the unpaid balance
after: the 10th of each month pursuant to prior notice
of the Trustees of said Funds.

Eric ^J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: September
1972
STATE OF New York )Ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of September, 1972 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed

PISMAHIHT ARBITRATOR, FILM LABORATORY

In the {latter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians,
Local 702 Welfare fund;
Motion picture Laboratory Technicians,
Local 731 Pension Fund

Award

and

AFC Laboratories, Inc.
The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of Local 702 Welfare Fund and Local 702 pension Fund; and AFC Laboratories, Inc.
having failed to appear after due notice, makes the following
AWARD:
For the months ©f June, July and August, If72 AFC
Laboratories, Inc. owes the Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians Local 702 Welfare Fund the sum of $3230.00.
For the months of June, July and August, 1972 AFC
Laboratories, Inc. owes the Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians Local 702 pension Fund the sum of $3280.88.
Accordingly AFC Laboratories, Inc. if directed to make
payment of said sums to sai4 Funds forthwith with interest, plus a penalty of it of the unpaid balance
after the 10th of each month pursuant to prior notice
of the Trustees of said Funds.

Iric/J. Schaerta
Permanent Arbitrator
DATED: September
1972
STATS OF New York )»»..
COUNTY OF Hew York)
On this
day of September, 1972 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J, Schwartz to me known and known to aae
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
District 65
and

Award

Airwork Service division of
Pacific Airtnotive Corporation, Inc.

and
Opinion

In accordance with Article V of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated January 31, 1972, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide certain disputes between the above named parties,,
A hearing was held on October 4, 1972 in Buena, New Jersey
at which time representatives of the parties appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross examine witnesses.
expressly waived.

The Arbitrator's oath was

Having duly heard the proofs and allegations

of the parties, the Undersigned makes the following AWARD:
Issue #1
The Union/s grievances dated May 9, 1972 (Step 2) and
May 4, 1972, (identified as Union Exhibit #1 and #2
respectively in the record,) regarding Material Stock
Department employees and two clerk/typists in the Shipping & Receiving Department are granted as to the
remedy sought.

It is undisputed that the Company did not respond to
these within the time limit prescribed in Step 4 of
the grievance procedure.

Section 5.2 of the contract

provides in pertinent part that any grievance not an-

- 2 swered by the Company within the time limits "shall
be sustained."

It goes on to provide that "time is of

the essence."
Accordingly, pursuant to the clear intent of Section
5.2, these grievances, not having been answered by the
Company at Step 4 within the contractually mandated time
limit, must be sustained.

In each grievance the Union

seeks as its remedy a re-evaluation of the jobs in question.

Hence the Company is directed to re-evaluate those

jobs.
As stipulated by the parties, the Undersigned retains
jurisdiction over these grievances.

In the event that

the re-evaluation of the jobs in question do not resolve
the disputes, the matters may be referred back to me, with
the procedural and substantive rights of the parties expressly reserved.
Issue #2
The Union's grievance dated August 16, 1971 involving
William Montana and Joseph Moats is denied.

The stipulat-

ed issue is:
Were the two employees, William Montana and
Joseph Moats entitled to move to permanent
day shift?
The relevant contract sections are Section 8, Shift
Transfers, paragraphs 6.81 and 6.82.

Contrary to the

Union's assertion, I find that the reference to "senior employee(s)n in both paragraphs are related and refer to
the same class of employees, namely those who were sen-

- 3 ior employees when the contract dated February 1,
1969 (joint exhibit #2) became effective.

Paragraph 6.81 gave those "senior employees" the
right to select their desired shift.

Under para-

graph 6.82 such senior employees who work on the
night shift may transfer to the day shift when a
new hire is placed on or transferred to the night
shift.
fy.

In either event the grievants do not quali-

They were not in the Company's employ as of the

effective date of the contract in question and therefore were not "senior employees" within the meaning of
paragraphs 6.81 and 6.82.

The Union contends that Article 6 Section 8 of
Addendum #5, negotiated subsequently by the parties,
places a different interpretation on paragraphs 6.81
and 6.82.

It asserts that the agreement to "post for

a steady night shift," and to fill jobs on the night
shift from any other source if it could not be filled
from in-plant bids, was intended, because the night
shift would thereby be staffed with bidders, junior
employees and new hires, to permit any employee who
had greater seniority to move to the day shift.

And

that therefore the Company erred when, following the employment of certain new hires on the night shift, it
transferred the more senior grievants to the "swing
shift."

In short, the Union contends that under Adden-

- 4 dum #5, when new hires are placed on the night
shift, any employee on that shift who enjoys greater seniority (though he may not be a "senior employee" within the original meaning of Sections 6.81 and
6.82) has the right to transfer to the day shift0

The testimony of the Union and Company witnesses as
to what took place in the course of the negotiation
of Article 6 Section 8 of Addendum #5 is sharply
conflicting and not determinative one way or the other.
The clause in question does not expressly accord the
rights which the Union asserts.

It seems to me that

had the parties intended to extend to employees with
greater seniority the same rights which Sections 6.81
and 6.82 accord to those "senior employees" who were
in the Company's employ on the effective date of the
contract, the Addendum clause would and should have explicitly so provided,,

To accept the Union's version, which would establish a
new and independent benefit for more senior employees
who were not on the payroll when the contract became
effective, the subsequently negotiated Addendum should
clearly and explicitly legislate that additional benefit,
Because the Addendum does not and because the other evidence on this question is inconclusive, said benefit can
neither be read into nor inferred from the present language of Article 6 Section 8 of Addendum #5.

, - 5 Accordingly the transfer of the grievants from the
night shift to the swing shift rather than to the
day shift, was not in violation of the contract0

Issue #3
The Union's grievance dated April 27, 1972 seeking
a re-evaluation of the classification Accessory Mechanic in the Accessory Department is denied.

In March 1972 the parties completed the most recent
contract negotiations including negotiating the rate
of pay for the Accessory Mechanics.

As of that time,

the agreed upon rate of pay was acceptable to the
Union for the duties which the employees so classified were then performing.

The Union's grievance was filed with the Company
approximately 50 days later.

The question then is

whether between the time that the parties agreed upon
the pay rate for the Accessory Mechanic and the date
of the grievance, there were such significant and substantial changes in the job duties as to constitute
the "establish(ment) (of) a new classification" within
the meaning of Section 34.4 of the contract.

Section

34.4 is the only contract clause which requires the
Company to negotiate a wage rate with the Union during
the contract term and which makes a disagreement over
the rate grievable and arbitrable.

But that section is

limited to the establishment of a "new classification."

- 6 (In the instant case the Company concedes that an
existing classification can become a new classification within the meaning of Section 34.4. if its
duties are "drastically changed.")

The Union has not

shown a "drastic change"or even changes of a substantial nature within the period of time from the negotiated wage rate to the date of the grievance.

The air-

plane engines which the mechanic now works on is larger
than those they previously handled.

And there is a

difference in the accessory work attendant thereto.
But the Accessory Mechanic who testified on behalf of
the Union stated that the new duties can be learned
in a matter of hours or at most within a few days.
To my mind that does not represent the kind of significant or substantial change in the duties of a
classification which would transform that classification, constructively, into a "new job" for the purpose of re-evaluation or negotiation of a new wage
rate under Section 34.4 of the contract.

Section 18.1 of the contract does not change the foregoing.

That section does not require the Company to

grant increases.

Rather, by its express terms, the

Company may at its discretion review a classification
and grant increases where a change of work or other
conditions warrant.

This permissive, rather than man-

datory, language of Section 18.1 means that the Union
may not rely upon that section to grieve or seek arbi-

- 7 tration over a claim for a job re-evaluation or a
change in an existing wage rate0
Issue #4
The Union's grievance on behalf of Lynford Meischke,
dated April 10, 1972, is denied.

I do not find that the Company improperly denied the
grievant a promotion to Lead Man.

The evidence clear-

ly establishes that roughly 50% of the Lead Man's
work was to be electrical in nature and that the grievant did not possess the requisite ability or knowledge
to perform or lead men in the performance of this type
of work.

Unless an arbitrary or capricious reason can

be shown, the Company has the right to re-arrange or
change the emphasis of the work to be performed by a
Lead Man, so long as that work is within the Lead Man
job classification.

That the previous Lead man per-

formed less electrical work does not mean that the
Company cannot require his successor to perform and
be qualified to perform more electrical work so long
as those assignments are part of the Lead Man's job.
Though certain allegations were raised I do not find
probative evidence in support of any conclusion that
the Company changed the Lead Man's job emphasis to
discriminatorily foreclose the grievant from the promotion.

Rather, based on the evidence I am satisfied

that the Company did so for legitimate business reasons,
Hence its selection of a less senior employee who is

- 8 qualified to do the electrical work, instead of the
grievant who lacked such qualifications, was not
violative of Section 10.1 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Eric /. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: November 27, 1972
STATE OF New York ) ss .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 27th day of November, 1972,
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
me to be the individual described in and
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
ted the same.

before me personally
known and known to
who executed the
to me that he execu-

Case No. 1830 0175 72 S

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

"
'
i
Local 553, International Brotherhood '
of Teamsters
'
i
and
'
i
Allied
_ _ _ _ New
_ _ York
_ _ _Service,
_ _ _ _ Inc.
_ _ _ _ _ _ '
!

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows;
For the reason set forth in the attached Opinion
the five day suspension of Lorenzo Romero is reduced to a suspension of two days. His pay and
records shall be adjusted accordingly.
/

Eric M Schmertz

DATED: April ^1972
STATE OF New York ) s s > .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this L> day of April, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

In the matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 553, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters
Opinion
and
Allied New York Service, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the five day suspension
of Lorenzo Romero? If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on February 25, 1972 at which time Mr.
Romero, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the above named Union and Company, hereinafter
referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared.

All concerned

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties ex-

pressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.
Based on the record before me, I find reasonable grounds
to conclude that the grievant did not wilfully fail to comply
with the instructions of Supervisor Sullivan to report for a
later fueling assignment.

The instructions given him that

night were ambiguous if not inconsistent.

I am satisfied that

Supervisor Sullivan told him to report to a specific location
for a subsequent fueling assignment after he finished his first
fueling jobs.

This the grievant failed to do.

And this to-

gether with his unavailability thereafter for virtually the
balance of his shift prompted the disciplinary suspension. Yet

- 2 the record also discloses that leadman Norman, later that night,
told the grievant that his first fueling assignment was his
"complete assignment" that night and that when completed he
was "not needed any more."

Obviously this is not to suggest

that Norman actually countermanded or superceded Sullivan's
instructions, but rather because Norman's instruction was the
last in sequence, it could be so construed (or misconstrued)
by the grievant.

Whether such interpretation was reasonable

depends on whether Norman had authority, actual or apparent,
to assign men to work and to relieve them of any further responsibility during the course of a regular shift.
I find that at least to the grievant, Norman had the requisite apparent authority.

By practice, a leadman gives out

the work assignments and work tickets to the employees working with him.

From time to time a leadman assumes supervisory

functions where no supervisor is present.

Norman had served

in that supervisory capacity before and apparently the grievant had worked with him under that arrangement.

On the night

in question at the National Airlines Terminal there was no
authorized supervisor in attendance.

Norman testified with-

out contradiction that he was told by the Company's Dispatcher
that he (Norman) "was in charge."
Therefore, though 1 think the grievant should have known
better, I am not prepared to conclude definitively that he
wilfully absented himself during the balance of his shift to
avoid the subsequent fueling assignment.

Rather I think he

concluded, albeit erroneously and perhaps negligently, that

- 3 Norman had relieved him of any further work and that Norman had
the authority to do so.
What the grievant did thereafter I cannot excuse.

For a

significant period of his shift he was "incommunicado" - totally out of reach to supervision and the office, while he "worked
his way back" to the point and time of clock out at the office.
Consequently, for a period of time for which he was being paid
he performed no work for the Company and could not be reached
for additional work assignments.

In fact, when the Company

looked for him in an effort to specifically assign him to the
subsequent fueling job (which to my mind would have cured any
ambiguity or inconsistency between the statements of Sullivan
and Norman), it could not find him because he was out of touch.
So, though I am prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt
regarding any inconsistency of instructions over a subsequent
job assignment I cannot excuse his total inaccessibility during
regular working hours when the Company sought to make that subsequent assignment unequivocal.
Moreover, assuming the accuracy of his testimony that as
he "worked his way back to the office" he became ill and spent
much of the time in rest rooms of various terminals, I think
he had a responsibility to report his condition to the Company
office or at least to maintain communication.

He candidly ex-

plained that he did not want to do so, because he would be required to clock out and thereby lose pay for the duration of
the shift.
it.

Though I understand his reluctance I cannot condone

The Company is entitled to a full day's work for a day's

„ pay and if an employee is out of touch for further assignments,

- 4 or is unable to work because of illness and hides himself away
in order to protect his full pay for that shift, the Company
does not get either actually or potentially what it is paying
for.
As I have absolved the grievant from wilful disregard of
a supervisor's order, but have not excused him from other improper actions on the night in question, I conclude that there
should be some penalty but less than the penalty which the Com
pany imposed.
Accordingly I reduce the five day suspension to a suspension of two days and the grievant 's pay and records shall be
adjusted accordingly.

/

Eric J . /S chme r t z
Arbitrator

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Trustees Taxicab Industry Pension Fund;
Trustees Taxicab Industry Health &
Welfare Fund
Award
and
Ardee Operating Corp.

The Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Trustees;
the above named Company having failed to appear after due
notice, makes the following AWARD:
For the period March 2, 1971 to June 30, 1972
Ardee Operating Corp. owes the Taxicab Industry
Pension Fund the sum of $2842.66.
For the period March 2, 1971 to June 30, 1972
Ardee Operating Corp. owes the Taxicab Industry
Health & Welfare Fund the sum of $6632.86.
Said sums are past due. Therefore Ardee Operating Corp. is directed to pay the foregoing sums
to said Funds forthwith with interest.

Eric J./Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: July
1972
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of July, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Anita Zakin
and
Board of Higher Education of the
City of New York

'
i
'
'
'
'

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated September 15, 1969 and having
been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The matter of the denial of the reappointment of Anita
Zakin is remanded for compliance with established procedures. I direct that the procedure applicable to
her case be commenced de novo and fully utilized, namely from the lowest committee level upward through the
full scope of the established procedure, I also direct, so far as practicable, that the Board staff the
various committees which will consider her qualifications with faculty and personnel different from those
who previously considered her case.
All other remedies requested by Miss Zakin are denied.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: June
1972
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of June, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
Case No. 1339 o732 70

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

Anita Zakin
and

Opinion

Board of Higher Education of the
City of New York

My Award of December 6, 1971 held:
"Within the meaning of Nota Bene there was an
arbitrary use of procedure in connection with
the denial of the reappointment of Anita Zakin..."
Before me now is the matter of remedy.
a hearing was held on March 30, 1972.

On that question

Thereafter written

statements were filed by the parties.
I have considered the entire record before me including
the record of the hearings leading up to my Award of December
6, 1971, the evidence and contentions of the parties submitted
at the hearing on March 30, 1972, the statements filed subsequent to that latter hearing, the cited Awards of other arbitrators, and pertinent court cases including the decision of
the New York State Supreme Court, New York County in the
Perlin case (Legislative Conference of the City University of
New York v. Board of Higher Education of the City of New York.)
I conclude that the Arbitrator's authority to fashion a remedy,
when, as in the instant case he has found an arbitrary use of
procedure, cannot go beyond the express remedy negotiated by
the parties in the Nota Bene, namely that:
"In such case the power of the arbitrator shall be
limited to remanding the matter for compliance with
established procedures.V
In short I find that by express contract provision the
parties have legislated the specific remedy in such cases, and

- 2 thereby have divested the arbitrator from authority to fashion
any other remedy.
When the Nota Bene was negotiated a variety of possible
remedies for procedural defects were well within the contemplation of the parties.

Reinstatement, reappointment with or with-

out tenure, back pay and the payment of the expenses of the
arbitration including counsel fees were among those reasonably
within the knowledge of the parties when the language of the
Nota Bene was agreed to.

Yet none were included„

In my view

that means that the parties intended that none of these remedies
were to be awarded or fashioned by the arbitrator.

Indeed,

when by mutually negotiated contract language the power of the
arbitrator is expressly limited as set forth in the Nota Bene,
he would exceed his authority if he failed to heed the limitation, no matter how inadequate or illusory he may think the
contract remedy to be, and no matter how much more of a remedy
he thought was necessary to make his Award meaningful„
Therefore in the instant case I have no choice but to remand Miss Zakin's grievance
back to the established procedures
"
for compliance with those established procedures.
In doing so, I deem it within my limited remedial power
and consistent with my Award and Opinion of December 6, 1971
to direct the Board to reconsider Miss Zakin's reappointment
ab initio, ie. through all the steps of the established procedures.

I am satisfied that because of the numerous arbitrary

uses of procedures which I found at various procedural levels,
Miss Zakin is entitled to a full procedural review of her
qualifications.

- 3 Moreover, consistent with my Opinion of December 6, 1971
in which I expressed doubt that procedural defects of a lower
level could be effectively cured at an appeal level, a de novo
and freshly objective evaluation of her qualifications is warranted, right from the beginning.

Therefore I direct the

Board to staff the various committees with different faculty
and personnel than those who previously served, as far as is
practicable.

Eric ft.Schmertz
Arbitrator

1 /
2-f

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Council of Supervisory Associations
of the Public Schools of New York City
and

Award

Board of Education of the City of
New York

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated October 1, 1969 to October 1,
1972 and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The Board of Education has calculated correctly
the sabbatical leave of absence record of Max
J. Weiss.

Eric/a. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: July 17, 1972
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 17th
and appeared Eric
be the individual
instrument and he

day of July, 1972, before me personally came
J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
described in and who executed the foregoing
acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
Case No. 13 39 1220 71

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Council of Supervisory Associations
of the Public Schools of New York City

'
'
i
'
'

and

Opinion

Board of Education of the City of
'
New York
'
- - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ '
In accordance with Article IX Section C of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement dated October 1, 1969 to October 1, 1972
between the Board of Education of the City of New York, hereinafter referred to as the "Board" and Council of Supervisory
Associations of the Public Schools of New York City, hereinafter referred to as the "Council," the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to hear and render an advisory decision on
the following stipulated issue:
Has the Board correctly calculated the sabbatical
leave of absence record of Mr. Max Weiss?
A hearing was held on April 10, 1972 at which time Mr.
Weiss, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the Council and Board appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross examine witnesses.
The dispute centers on whether sabbatical leaves between
the periods February 8, 1932 and August 30, 1932; and again
from September 1, 1933 to January 31, 1934 constitute two
sabbatical leaves of absences as recorded by the Board, or
whether as contended by the Council both periods of time should
be treated as a single sabbatical leave of absence.
The precise fact situation, though apparently unique to

- 2 this grievant, is of consequence because it affects his retirement-leave-in-lieu of sabbatical benefit under Article VI
Section C of the contract, (i.e. that benefit plus retirement
pay would be higher if the grievant's contentions are upheld.)
Both parties agree that there is a pausity of evidence on
the intent and practices of the Board regarding sabbatical
leaves of absences for the years 1932 to 1934.

Based on what

was presented in this proceeding there is no record of any one
but the grievant having received two different periods of time
off, separated by a full academic year of active employment under the Board's then sabbatical leave policy.

Only one other

somewhat similar case was referred to, namely that of a Mr.
Jack Cohn who was granted 12 consecutive months off between
1934 and 1935; and was charged by the Board with two sabbatical
leaves of absence covering that period.

Unlike the grievant1s

case Cohn's total leave(s) was not broken into two segments,
separated by a period of active employment.

Though Cohn is

not a grievant in this proceeding the Council contends that
his leave record, like that of the grievant1s was erroneously
calculated by the Board.
Absent persuasive evidence to the contrary, the normal
and logical interpretation of the facts applicable to the
grievant's situation - namely two specific periods of time off
separated by a full year of active employment - is to deem
those two periods as two separate and distinct leaves of absence.

In my view an interpretation that treats two six

month periods of time separated by a full year of active employment as the same leave of absence, is both unorthodox and

- 3 untraditional.

Normally, a leave of absence is a continuous

period of time during which an employee is in inactive status.
And that period of time is not severed into unconnected parts
by a resumption of full employment.

Rather, full time active

employment is resumed when the leave of absence comes to an
end.

Here, absent other evidence, a normal interpretation of

the facts leads to only one conclusion - that the grievant received a leave of absence for six months in 1932 which came to
an end with his return to active teaching on September 1, 1932.
And that he received a second leave of absence a year later
commencing September 1, 1933.
With the foregoing traditional interpretation, together
with the fact that for the first time these many years later
the grievant challenges the method by which the Board recorded
his sabbatical leaves in 1932 and 1933, the burden is on the
grievant and the Council to demonstrate that
different interpretation is proper.

a

radically

In short, it is the griev-

ant1 s burden to show that by policy, intent and practice, the
leaves which the Board granted him for the two separate six
month periods in question should be treated as a single sabbatical leave of absence for retirement purposes.
I do not find that that burden has been met.
The by-laws of the Board of Education effective in the
year 1932 do not support the grievant's position in this case.
The relevant section of those by-laws reads:
Under regulations approved by the Board of Education,
the Board of Superintendents may recommend to the
Board of Education for approval sabbatical leaves of
absence with pay for a period of one or two school
terms to members of the teaching and supervising staff...
(Emphasis added)

- 4 The foregoing wording is subject to only one interpretation, and that is that the length of a leave of absence may be
either for one school term or two school terms.

Or in other

words for one six month period or for one 12 month period.
Clearly, it would be erroneous to argue or conclude that until
two school terms or a full year had been used, a teacher had
not received a full leave of absence.

Any such argument or

conclusion would manifestly be inconsistent with the foregoing
by-law which authorizes leaves of absence of either one term or
two terms.
Nor was this unfair to a teacher or staff member who
applied for a one rather than a two term leave of absence.

At

that time, in the midst of the Depression, leaves of absence
were not especially attractive economically.
not receive his full pay.

The employee did

Rather he received his pay less what

it cost the Board to hire a replacement.

So it is not surpris-

ing that some employees would select a leave of absence of a
single term rather than two terms.

Hence I find it neither un-

fair nor discriminatory, when, for purposes of calculating the
total number of sabbatical leaves granted, a six month leave
was treated in those years as a full rather than as a part of
a leave of absence.
The Council contends that the amended by-laws of the Board
of Education in October, 1932 established the measurement of a
sabbatical leave of absence, as one year; and that the grant to
the grievant of a second six months period as set forth in list
"C" promulgated in May of 1933 simply accorded him a "second

- 5 section" of the leave he previously received in order to bring
him up to a full and single one year sabbatical leave pursuant
to the amended by-laws.
While there is some logic to this argument and though the
amended regulation of October, 1932 and list "C" of May 1933
setting forth names of teachers receiving another six month
leave might be interpreted as the Council suggests, there is
too much in both documents which, on balance, negates any such
definitive interpretation.

The May 24, 1933 list of employees

granted sabbatical leaves provides that list "C" (on which the
grievant appears) are those "who have had a previous sabbatical
leave for one term" and who are "granted an additional sabbatical leave of absence for the school term beginning September 8,
1933." (Emphasis added).
Hence by the very terms of the document relied on by the
Council, the grievant explicitly fell into the category of those
who have had a previous sabbatical leave and were being granted an additional sabbatical leave.

Accordingly the Board's cal-

culation of the two disputed periods of time as two sabbatical
leaves of absence is consistent with the express provisions of
the May 1933 document,,
I do not find that the October 1932 amended regulations
regarding sabbatical leaves of absence constitute a measurement
of any single leave as no less than one year.

The amended reg-

ulation provides in substance that at least seven years of
active employment must elapse before a teacher who has received
a year leave of absence is again entitled to a subsequent

- 6 sabbatical leave.

As I see it this amended regulation sets up

a specific period of minimum eligibility of active employment
before a teacher who has enjoyed a sabbatical leave of one
year can apply for another.
In short it defines eligibility for a subsequent sabbatical
leave but does not, especially in the face of the wording of
the later May, 1933 sabbatical leave schedule, define the
length of a sabbatical leave.

Rather, viewed as it must be in

conjunction with the other relevant documents, it means to me
that once a teacher has received a total of a year off, he may
not seek any additional sabbatical time until he has put in
seven or more years of subsequent active employment.

But it

does not mean that sabbatical leaves of absence granted for
less than a year are to be calculated as other than a sabbatical
leave for the purposes of Article VII Section C of the present
contract.
It seems to me that any disagreement with the foregoing
interpretation of the October 1932 amended regulation is dispelled by the Board's 1955 by-laws.

In pertinent part these

by-laws provide:
Under regulations approved by the Board of Education
the Superintendent of Schools may grant .... sabbatical leaves of absences with pay for six months covering a period from August 1 to January 31 inclusive or
from February 1 to July 31 inclusive
As I see it this is a codification of the prior practices
and "regulations approved by the Board."

At least there is no

evidence that this by-law, specifically defining the length of
a leave of absence as "six months," represents any change in

- 7 the policy or practice of the Board from the earlier years. And
absent any such evidence I am constrained to conclude that it
represents nothing more than a reiteration of the Board's prior
policy and practice.
Finally, it is undisputed that at present, a sabbatical
leave of absence is of six months duration.

Though standing

alone I would not consider the 1955 by-law or the present policy
to be determinative of a set of facts arising in 1933 and 1934.
But, in the absence of significant evidence showing that the
practices and policies of the former years were different than
the years 1955 on, the more specific policies of the latter
years serve to clarify how sabbatical leaves of absence were and
should have been counted during the earlier period.
is what I think we have here.

And that

The Council has not advanced

sufficient evidence to show that the policies and practices between 1932 and 1934 as they affected the grievant, were different from the explicit policy from 1955 on.

Accordingly the

grievance must be denied.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arb/trator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Boston Edison Company
and

Ruling
of
Chairman
Case No.1130 0548 70

Utility Workers of America

The Undersigned, as Chairman of the Board of Arbitration,
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties in the above matter, makes the following RULING:
The issue(s) in dispute in this case shall be resolved either by direct negotiations between the Company
and the Union at the next contract negotiations in or
around May, 1973, or by an Arbitration Award by this
Board of Arbitration.
Accordingly, the rendition of an Award in this case
shall be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the
next contract negotiations. If those negotiations resolve the issue(s) in dispute no Arbitration Award will
be rendered. If the issue(s) are not so resolved, the
Board of Arbitration in the instant case will render
its Award within ten days of a request to do so from
either or both parties.
Pending the foregoing the Company shall not make any of
the schedule changes which are the subject of the issue(s)
in this case-

Eric/J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: November 27, 1972
STATE OF New York )ss..
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 27th day of November, 1972, before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
the same.

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
West Virginia Union Mutuel Clerics
Local 553
Service Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO
and
Charles Town Turf Club, Inc.

'
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'
i
'

.
Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated November 27, 1967 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
Issue #1
The Union's grievance is denied. The Mutuel employees
of Charles Town Turf Club who handle the multiple pool
wagering for four pools are not entitled to an additional $1.00. The limitation of $3.00 contained in the
Shenandoah contract is incorporated in the Charles Town
Turf Club contract thereby effectively limiting the maximum to $3.00 per day.
Issue #2
The Union's grievance is granted. The Employer is required to limit the number of machines to be supervised by any seller-supervisor to eight machines even if
some of the machines supervised are trizacta machines.
Issue #3
The Union's grievance is granted. The grievants who
are trizacta machine sellers are entitled to $2.00
per night over their base pay as "three-way/sellers."

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

!jj
ij

West Virginia Union Mutuel Clerks
Local 553
Service Employees International
, Union, AFL-CIO

|
i

and
Charles Town Turf Club, Inc.

'
i
'
•
'
^

Opinion

'
'

In accordance with Article XIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated November 27, 1967 between West Virginia
Union Mutuel Clerks Local 553, Service Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," and
Charles Town Turf Club, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the
"Employer," the Undersigned was selected as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following three stipulated issues:
1. The Collective Bargaining Agreement between
Charles Town Turf Club and Local 553 has appended to it a letter agreement, executed by the
President of the Local Union and the President
of the Company, confirming that notwithstanding
the terms and conditions contained in the Collective Bargaining Agreement between Charles Town
Turf Club and the Union, "All terms and conditions
contained in the contract between this Union and
Charles Town Racing Association (Shenandoah Downs)
(an adjoining race track which abuts the property
of this race track) and which were not specifically
made a part of the contract between this Union and
Charles Town Turf Club, Inc., will apply and become
part of such contract with Charles Town Turf Club,
Inc., as if the same had been fully set forth therein. "
The Collective Bargaining Agreement for both race
tracks provide that the mutuel employees shall receive $1.00 extra for handling multiple pool wagering. The Shenandoah Downs contract, then, specifically provides that this additional pay for such
work shall "not exceed $3.00 per day." The Charles
Town Turf Club contract does not contain that express limitation in Schedule "A", but the employer
relies on the letter agreement incorporating all

term.'-; of the Shcnancloah contract into the
Charles Town Turf Club contract.
The issue is whether the employees at Charles
Town Turf Club are entitled to an additional
$1.00 for the mutuel employees who handle the
multiple pool wagering for four pools, or whether
the limitation of $3.00 contained in the Shenandoah contract is incorporated into the Charles
Town Turf Club contract thereby effectively limiting the maximum to $3.00 per day.
_2. Schedule "A" of the contract presently in
force and effect, provides that the number of
machines to be handled by seller-supervisors
on "win...place.,.show" shall be limited to 8
machines per seller-supervisors. The Union
claims that the seller-supervisors for the
trizacta come under this limitation.
The Company contends that the limitation applies only
to "straight wagering" betting and not for
multiple pool wagering.

|
The issue presented is whether management is
required to limit the number of machines to be
supervised by any seller-supervisor to 8 machines, even though some of the machines supervised are trizacta machines.

3. The Union claims that trizacta machine sellers
•are entitled to $2.00 per night over their basepay, alleging that they are "three-way sellers,"
as provided for in the contract. The Company contends that trizacta wagering is a multiple pool
type of wager, similar to the exacta and is, therefore, not included for such additional benefit.

Hearings were held in Charles Town, West Virginia on September 7 and September 30, 1972 at which time representatives of
the Union and Employer appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
oath.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's

Post hearing statements and memoranda of law were filed

by the Union and Employer.

I

Determination

of this issue turns on whether a "letter

agreement" or "side letter" dated January 31,.1968, executed
by Mr. Irvin Kovens, the then President of the Employer and
Mr. Samuel J, Hoffman, the then president of the Union, is bindin
on the Union.

The pertinent part of that letter is set forth in

the foregoing stipulated issue #1.
i
I
j
If the terms of said letter are binding on the Union, the
i
I relevant provision of the Shenandoah contract is controlling and
j
I

the Union's grievance seeking an additional $1.00 for Mutuel employees who handle multiple pool wagering for four pools must be
denied.

On the other hand if the terms of said letter are not

I binding on the Union, the provisions of the Employer's contract
I
! with the Union providing for the additional $1.00 without a $3.00
maximum limit should be enforced.
The enforceability of the Januar}^ 31, 1968 letter, not its
authenticity, is what the Union challenges.
The Union asserts that Mr. Hoffman, the then Union Presi-

i
j

I dent, was not authorized to enter into any such agreement with
j the Employer; that he did so without knowledge or consent of the
I Union's bargaining committee or its other officers; that the

j

! January
•

j

31, 1968 letter was not submitted to the Union member-

ship for ratification as required by the Union constitution; and
that it did not come to the attention of the present Union leadership until about a year before the instant arbitration hearing,
following which the Union grieved.

In short, the Union contends

i that Hoffman acted ultra vires and that his action did not and
| cannot bind the Union.

_ 4 The Employer contends that said letter was negotiated with
Hoffman in a manner similar to the negotiations of the basic
Collective Bargaining Agreement; and other "side letters" which
.are not disputed; that it had no reason to doubt Hoffman's authority; that it had no reason to doubt that the terras of the
letter would be presented to the Union membership any differently
than any other contract provisions; that the Employer's request
for Hoffman's agreement to the content of said letter was both
logical and reasonable considering the circumstances of the
j negotiations (between the Union and the two adjacent but differf!
I ently owned race tracks -- this Employer and Shenandoah); and
Ij that therefore the terms of the letter should now be binding on
i
[the Union as part of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
I have no reason to question the Union's contention that
its bargaining committee and its officers were unaware of the
!J

| letter agreement between its President and the Employer; nor do
j
ii I doubt its assertion that neither the letter nor its content

was submitted to the Union membership for ratification.

Also I

accept the testimony of Union representatives that they first

!
learned about the letter and its content several years after its ;
:
i

execution.

j

Yet I find these factors immaterial to determination of the
i

basic question.

I conclude, these factors notwithstanding, that ;
|
the letter of January 31, 1968 setting forth an agreement reach1i
'
'!
i'ed between the then respective Presidents of the Employer and the j
Union is now binding on the Union and enforceable as a contract
I term.

Manifestly, Hoffman had "apparent authority" to reach such
I

ii agreement.

He was the President of the Union..

On behalf of the

; Union he was the sole signatory to the basic Collective Bargain!'

ji ing Agreement. Also he was the sole signatory to a different
II|| and undisputed "letter agreement" which is attached to and made
ij
I part of the basic agreement and xvhich was similarly signed by
i!

ij Kovens.

Under those circumstances the Employer had no reason to 1

i; believe that Hoffman had any less authority to agree to and sign
|I

ij on behalf of the Union the January 31, 1968 letter, than he had
!j in agreeing to and signing the basic contract and a different
ij
jj letter agreement.
:
Moreover, there is no evidence that the Employer had any
reason to believe or know that the January 31, 1968 understanding
would not be or was not ratified by the Union membership pursuant
to the provisions of the Union constitution.

Indeed I find no

evidence of notice to the Employer that the terms of the basic
agreement or any of the "letter agreements" would not be binding
!until or unless the Union membership ratified it, or until notice
11
I'of such ratification was given to the Employer. Rather I am sat|
'isfied that the Employer was not involved in nor advised of the
internal Union procedures or constitutional requirements of rati'
'II
fication and that the Employer had reasonable grounds to believe

Ii

that the basic contract and the "letter agreements" were contract- ;
I

•

ually binding on both parties and/or ratified by the membership
!
•Lf necessary, unless the Union expressly advised otherwise, (i.e.
£or example, that a ratification vote failed.) No such express

i'notice was

conveyed by the Union to the Employer.

Hence the Em-

i

j
I

ployer had legitimate grounds to believe that the basic agreement and die letters, including the letter of January 31, 1968,
were accepted by the Union and enforceable.
Moreover the Employer's request: for and subsequent reliance
on the January 31, 1968 understanding was founded on a logical
and bonafide business need.

At the time that the Employer

agreed, to the contract terms, a few months yet remained on its
predecessor contract with the Union.

At the same time the Union

was on strike against the adjacent and then separately owned
Shenandoah race track.

It is clear that among other reasons,

the Employer agreed to a new contract with the Union earlier
than the expiration of his predecessor contract, in the expectation that it would be instrumental in bringing about a settlement of the strike between the Union and Shenandoah.

But having

agreed to terms earlier than was necessary, the Employer wished
| to protect himself from a competitive disadvantage which might
arise if a subsequently negotiated contract between the Union
and Shenandoah contained provisions more favorable to Shenandoah
than similar substantive provisions in the Union's contract with
this Employer.

Hence the obvious logic for, and explanation of

I
i

JKoven's request of Hoffman for the January 31, 1968 understand! ing, which undisputedly was meant to require that a provision
in the Shenandoah contract more favorable than a provision covering the same subject in the Employer's contract, would prevail
as to both, thereby maintaining a competitive parity between the
two race tracks.

(Similarly a provision in the subsequently

negotiated Shenandoah contract, more favorable to the Union than
fa contract clause with the Employer covering the same subject,

_ 7 shall be applicable to the contractual relationship between the
Union and the Employer.)
But it is the former •-- namely a Shenandoah contract term
Which is more favorable to the Employer than his own contract
'.clause on the same subject -- that is involved in the instant
I
p grievance.
j
I have carefully considered the memoranda of law submitted
i
t

j by counsel for the Union and the Employer and I am persuaded
I
jthat under the foregoing circumstances, the weight of current

Ij
illegal authority supports the Employer's contention that the January 31, 1968 letter and the agreement set forth therein is conI

i

!tractually binding on both the Union and the Employer for the
|'term of the present Collective Bargaining Agreement.
;
'
Both the Statute and the cases point inexorably to the con-

!
t
,

elusion that when the chief Union negotiator had apparent auth-

I
prity;. when the Employer had no reason to believe or suspect
i
i
that he was acting outside the scope of his authority; where the

j
j
j
!

agreement reached is within the scope of subjects for collective
I

'(bargaining; and where the Employer has not been expressly notiI fied that the agreement is subject to membership ratification or,
in the alternative, notified that the membership has failed to
ratify the agreement, the Union negotiator's action is binding on
the Union even if it is later shown that he acted beyond the authority the Union gave him and his agreement was not submitted to
jl
•
i the Union membership for ratification.
Sections 301 (b) and 301 (e) of the National Labor
Relations act read;
Any labor organization which represents employees
in an industry affecting commerce as defined in

i

this ACL and any employer whore activities affect
commerce as defined in this AcL shall be bound by
the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization
may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the
employees whom it represents in the courts of the
United States, Any money judgment against a labor
organization in a district court of the United States
shall be enforceable only against the organization as
an entity and against its assets, and shall not be
enforceable against any individual member or his
assets .
For the purposes of this section, in determining
whether any person is acting as an "agent" of
another person so as to make such other person, responsible for his acts, the question of whether
the specific acts performed^ were actually authcorjlzed_or subsequently ratif ied_shal_l not_be controlling. (Emphasis added)
Section 2(13) of the amended NLRA provides that in determining whether any person is acting as an agent of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts,
the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually
authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.
CCH explains that the importance of this provision arises
from the fact that alleged union and employer unfair labor practices, under Section 8, will originally be committed, not by
the unions or employers themselves, but rather, by persons acting
forj:hem; supervisory personnel, in the case of employers; and
iorganizers or local union officers or agents, in the case of
unions.
The agency provision is important also in connection with •
the definition of the term "employer" in Section 2(2)

(P.1625).

That definition states the term "employer" includes any person
acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly.
The provision of Section 2 (13) adopts the common-lax^ rules
of agency.

At common law, persons are held responsible for acts

„ 9 -•
committed by agents within the scope of their general authority.
Adoption of the common-law rule makes it clear that the
l

agency rule provided for in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, requiring
actual participation in or authorization or ratification of
particular acts, is not applicable under the present Act. The
ji

Board, in j^_|J-_J:;iojT££l^

Co.)

j| (1948), 79 NLRB 1487, held the following principles controlling:
|j
ji
_!. Consent of the parties to an agency relationship
j
:,'
need not be express and overt but may be manifested by
||
conduct from which it may be inferred that the principal
actually intended to confer authority.
t

_2_. Where a_ _p_rincipal has empowered an agent to act for
him in a gene rajl area, the principal is responsible for
all acts _of_the agent within the scope of his general
_
__t hough the principal has not specifically
,_eyen
authorized or in dejad may _haye _specif -ical ly forbidden tfne
acts in question.^ (Emphasis added)

j

The House-Senate conference agreement, in defining the term
"employer," struck out the vague phrase in the Wagner Act 'anyone acting in the interest of an employer' and inserted in lieu

!i;j

to

thereof the word "agent."

The term agent is defined in section

jj 2(13) and section 301 (e), since it is used throughout the unfair

!l
labor practice sections of title I and in sections 301 and 303
of title III. . .
...Of course, the definition applies equally in the
responsibility imputed to both employers and labor
organizations for the acts of their officers or representatives in the scope of their employment.
"It is true that this definition was written to avoid
the construction which the Supreme Court in the recent
case of United States against United Brotherhood of
Carpenters placed upon section 6 of the Norris-La
Guardia Act which exempts organizations from liability for illegal acts committed in labor disputes unless proof of actual instigation, participation, or
ratification can be shown. The construction the
Supreme Court placed on this special exemption was

Ii
|

i

so broad that Mr, Justice Frankfurter
for the dissenting minority, pointed out that
all unions need do in the future to escape
liability for the illegal actions of their officers is simply to pass a standing resolution disclaiming such responsibility. The conferees
agreed that the ordinary law of agency should
apply to employer and union representatives. Consequently, when a supervisor acting in his capacity as such, engages in intimidating conduct or
illegal action with respect to employees or labor
organizers his conduct ca.n be imputed to his employer regardless whether or not the Company
officials approved or were even aware of his actions,
Similarly union business agents or stewards, acting
in their capacity of union officers, may make their
union guilty of an unfair-labor practice when they
engage in conduct made an unfair-labor practice in
the bill, even though no formal action had been
taken by the union to authorize such conduct."
Statement by Senator Robert A_._ Tart, 93 Cong.
Record p. 7001 (June 12, 1947;) House~Conf._ Rept.
No. 510, _80th Cong. 1st Sess. 36; L
o^ry^_of__Lab or Management Relations^ Ac t, Vol. 2 p . 1622.

Cases before the National Labor Relations.Board on questions of agency and the responsibility of labor unions for the
acts of individual officers, are generally in regard to violations of Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.

The

j

facts usually involve strike situations or incidents of refusal
jjto bargain collectively.

j
i

An early case, International Longshoremen's and Warehousejmen's Union, CIO, Local 6, etc.; Petulma Unit, etc, and Sunset
Line and Twine Company, 79 NLRB 207 (1948) came before the

j

Board soon after the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 went
into effect.

i
;

The complaint against the union alleged that during a mass
picketing demonstration, an officer and an agent of the union
!
i

;
j
i

!restrained and coerced employees of the company, who were attempt-

II

ling to go to work, by intimidating and threating them with bodily

!

- 11 harm.

The trial examiner found that the International and two

of its Locals, by the acts of their agents, had engaged in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of the Act.
The question presented was whether or not the conduct of
individuals could be properly imputed to one or both of the
respondent unions "for unless the record justifies that imputation, there was no violation of the Act in this case."
In pertinent part the trial examiner said:
"we are to treat labor organizations as legal
entities, like corporations, which act and can
only act through their duly appointed agents,
as distinguished from their individual members...
We have rarely had occasion to examine the relationships between a labor organization and its
officers or other persons allegedly representing
it, especially for the purpose of deciding whether or not the officer or other person was acting,
in a particular instance, as the agent of the
labor organization...(F)undamental rules of the
law and agency ... must control our decision on
the issue of responsibility.
1. The burden of proof' is on the party asserting
an agency relationship, both as to the existence
of the relationship and as to the nature and extent
of the agent's authority.
In this case, for example,
it was incumbent upon the General Counsel to prove,
not only that the acts of restraint and coercion
alleged in the complaint were committed, but also
that those acts were committed by agents of the
Respondent Unions, acting in their representative
capacity. The Respondents' failure to introduce
evidence negating the imputations in the complaint
did not relieve the General Counsel of that burden.
2. Agency is a contractual relationship, deriving
from the mutual consent of principal and agent
that the agent shall act for the principal.
But
the principal's consent, technically called authorization or ratification, may be manifested by conduct, sometimes even passive acquiescence as well
as by words. Authority to act as agent in a given
manner will be implied whenever the conduct of the
principal is such as to show that he actually intended to confer that authority.

j
i

i
i

i

i
|

i
- 12 -3. A principal may in- responsible for the act of
his agent within the scope of the agent's general
authority, or the 'scope of his employment' if
the agent is a servant, even though the principal
has not specifically authorized or indeed may have
specifically forbidden the act in question. It is
enough if the principal actually empowered the
agent to represent him in the general area within.
which the agent acted."
The Examiner then considered the question of the business
agent and the vice president of the local who had allegedly performed the coercive acts.
"The record does not otherwise show how Vail's
duties are defined, or what are the limitations of
his authority; but neither is there any evidence
to rebut the inference, which we might well draw
from his title alone, that he was, at the time of
the events involved in this case, vested with the
powers of a general agent to conduct the Local's
business in the Petaluma area." That business consisted, necessarily, of collective bargaining and
concerted activities of the membership in furtherance of the Local's objectives in collective bargaining. The strike against the Company in this
case was in that sense, the Local's business.
"It follows that the Local was responsible for
•the wrongful acts of Vail and individuals under his
direction which were performed in furtherance of
those same purposes and were of the same general
character as, or incidental to, the peaceful picketing, and substantially within the area of this labor
dispute in space and time. Of course, the record is
barren of evidence showing that Local 6 specifically
authorized or ratified Vail's assault on Sousa, for
example, but the absence of such proof is immaterial
so long as there is evidence that Vail was on that
occasion, acting within the scope of his general authority to direct this strike and picketing."
Enterprise Association of Steamfitters, Local 638 AND
HV & AC Contractors Association, Inc.,

170 NLRB No. 44, (1968),

concerned a complaint that the union had refused to sign an
agreement with the HV & AC Contractors Association

(hereinafter

"Association") embodying terras and conditions of employment.

i'I ;
I,

:

agreed on by the parties. There was no history of collect-

;j ivc bargaining between them. Negotiations began, with represenI
I tatives of both parties stating that they had-full authority to
| t

'[ negotiate.
! ,*
[

ij

Previously, the union had a collective bargaining agree-

!i

;| ment with the Mechanical Contractors Association (hereinafter
j

| "Contractors") with whom they were also negotiating a new conIj
ji
j| tract. It was agreed between the union and the Association
i'

that the latter would accept the same contract reached by the
union and the Contractors.
arrangement.

The parties shook hands on that

An agreement was negotiated between the union and

the Contractors and a copy of the memorandum of agreement was
sent to the Association who signed it and returned it to the
union together with letters from each of the Association members authorizing it to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with the union.
The union continually delayed signing, and then insisted
that each of the Association members sign an individual working agreement.

The Association protested. The union called a

work stoppage.

This was enjoined.

The entire procedure of

new negotiations was repeated and a new memorandum of agreement
was reached.

The union again refused to sign and contended that

its representatives had no authority at any time to meet and
negotiate a contract-with the Association's representatives.
It relied upon a motion approved at a union meeting that no
action should be taken "until discussed and approved by the
body."

The NLRB found Chat the union's representatives readied
a binding agreement with the Association on behalf of the union.
The Board affirmed the trial examiner's findings that the union
- refused to bargain collectively, thereby violating Section 8(b)
(3) of the NLRA.
NLRB v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, Paperhangers,
.etc., 334 F 2d 729 (7th Cir. 1964) also concerned a refusal by
the union to sign a written collective bargaining agreement containing provisions upon which the union and the employers involved had agreed upon following a series of negotiation meetings between union and employer representatives.
The union claimed that its membership had not ratified the
agreement as required by the union constitution.

It further

asserted that the cause was moot because the agreement in question had expired and the union was currently bargaining a new
contract with the employers.

The Court said:

"We are not impressed with the union's contention
that membership ratification was an additional prerequisite. The representations made by the Union's
president and negotiation representative and the history of the 30 years of contract negotiation and execution between the parties, are inconsistent with the
Union's belated resurrection and reliance on the long
dormant provision of its constitution." (Emphasis
added).
It was held that the union was guilty of an unfair labor
practice by refusing to sign the formal contract document.
Sheet Metal Workers Union, Local 63 and Inland Steel Products Company,

120 NLRB Wo. 216 (1958) concerned collective

bargaining that took place between the parties in 1956.

The

union refused to sign the contract whose terms had been agreed
i ; upon.

:

- 15 The union claimed that in 1955 it had adopted by-laws em;

powering its executive board to act as a negotiations committee
and requiring that all agreements be submitted to its member•• ship for approval.

The union further claimed that these by-

laws therefore lessened the authority of its business represen;
|

tatives to conclude binding agreements.

j

The NLRB three-member panel found that the union's negotiators "acted as if they had full authority to reach and execute
a binding agreement, and exercised their apparent authority dur-

I
ing the 1956 bargaining in the manner displayed during the 1954
and 1-955 course of negotiations."
"It is not at all clear whether this provision of
the by-laws represented a modification of the Respondent's bargaining procedures or was merely a
written codification of its past practice; nor is
it clear whether the provision was intended to apply
to bargaining between the Respondent and the small
number of so-called manufacturing employers, of
whom the Company was one, or only to the multiemployer associations in the construction industry with
whom the Respondent had more extensive dealings.
But whatever the 1955 _by-laws were meant to accomplish, we are satisfied that the Trial Examiner was
correct in concluding that Desch and his fellow neg_otiators did not alert the Company to_the possibility
"that their right to bind the Respondent had been diminished. " (Emphasis added).
Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 AND California Association of Employers, 123 NLRB No. 114,

involved a stormy series

of bargaining sessions and strikes involving the Association and
the union.

An agreement was reached, and the membership voted

by secret ballot to accept its terms.

The union representative

then announced to the Association that the union would no longer
negotiate on a local basis but only on an industry basis at its
regional headquarters; that local representatives were authorized

- 16 only to negotiate and administer contracts -- not to sign them.
This was rejected by the Association on the grounds that
(1) there had been no prior notice of such limitation on the
representative's authority, (2) agreement on contract terms had
been reached, (3) in view of the history of bargaining, the
union was out of order in refusing to sign it, and (4) such refusal would be a violation of the Act.
The NLRB found from the bargaining history between the
parties, that the business agents of the union had clearly established their apparent authority to conclude and execute
agreements on behalf of the union and that the Association xvas
justified in relying upon this apparent authority.
See also UAW2_and _its Local.453 AND Maramount Automotive
Products^_Inc., 134 NLRB No. 128, where the union negotiated an
agreement which was settled on final terms, ratified by the membership and the document executed.

The union then disclaimed

the authority of its bargaining agent, demanded further provisions, and refused to sign the formal agreement.
The Board found that the Company was justified in relying
on the apparent authority of the union bargaining agents, and
observed that the letter insisting on new provisions was by its
wording an affirmance of the continuing authority of the agent
rather than an intent to limit his authority.
Two recent cases affirm the preceding case.

First is

International Union of Elevator Operators, Local 8 ANDNational
Elevator Industry, Inc. 185 NLRB No. 112 (1970)
The Board therein observed that while there was no con-

' stitutional requirement of membership ratification herein, the
:j

jj Board and the courts had held that even. though _ the constitution
a

i ' p 1 oy c r may rely u]3on_ the _appa ren_t mithor i ty _o £__£fl2^£l:L2iL

ir
I

sentative t o c a n l u d e a n r e e r n e n t ; where^ _tlT_ere_is_ _ g
^ (EraPhasis added)

I!

It was therefore held that the union's refusal to sign an

;j

j! agreement reached by the negotiators, because of the subsequent

i

i j failure of ratification by the membership, was a violation of
tj

!l Section 8(b) (3) of the Act.
II
1,|1
And in ^
Glass
WorkersUr^n,^ocal_J.22^^
_
^._ -_! wConference
Board, 162 NLRB 168, the Board held that the union
.» - ™ ,«™.. •—
«*™.. .
(

|i violated Section 8(b) (3) by refusing to sign a fully-agreedupon contract notwithstanding a failure to meet the union's
constitutional requirement of ratification by the local's membership. '
A 1972 California case reaffirms the preceding case law;
Pharmaseal Laboratories, Irwindale, Calif, and Carl Smith, an
;i

individual (United Metaltronics and Hospital Supply Employees,
Local 955, United Brick and Clay Workers of America, AFL-CIO,
and Miscellaneous Warehousemen, Drivers and Helpers, Local 986,
International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-

1. Note that George Meany was quoted in an article "Labor
Leaders" in the Catholic Standard, Washington, D.C., of
March 5, 1970, by Msgr. George C. Higgins "urging that
unions empower their negotiating committees to conclude
binding agreements without the need for subsequent ratification. "

j
i
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In

1965, Local

955 and Local 986 were certified by the Board as the joint representatives for the bargaining unit and thereafter entered
into a three, year contract with the employer.
tions for a renewal contract began.

In 1968 negotia-

Local 986 refused to par-

ticipate on the ground that its petition was then pending before the NLRB seeking to sever the warehousemen from the unit.
The 1968 negotiations resulted in a new three year contract signed by the employer and agents of Local 955 on behalf
of the joint representatives.

Neither Local 986 nor its agent

signed, but said local accepted the benefits of the contract,
abided by its terms and never questioned its validity.
In 1971 the employer was notified that the joint representatives wished to negotiate another renewal contract.

Local 955

|| and Local 986 were named as local agents and co-chairmen of a
bargaining committee.

Numerous bargaining sessions took place

and agreement was reached.

Although formerly concurring in the

proposals, Local 986 now questioned the final agreement and
notified the employer and Local 955 that the agreement was invalid because Local 955 had no authority to sign on behalf of
the unit.
The Board found;
(1) that the contract contained no provision that it was •
f.o be subject to employee ratification or to signature by ••"any agents of Local 955 or 986 as such.
(2) Local 986 left the negotiating responsibility almost
entirely to Local 955.

(3)

Both locals had the obligation to bargain on behalf

•

of the unit employees on a joint basis and with one voice.

i
j
(4)

Once the employer had relied in good faith upon the

I authority of Local 955 as a bargaining agent the validity of
I

the consummated agreement could not be disputed.

Accordingly the Union's grievance on Issue #1 is denied.
I The limitation of $3.00 contained in the Shenandoah contract
! is incorporated into the Charles Town Turf Club contract, therej
: by effectively limiting the maximum to $3.00 per day.

Issue #-2

|
j

Based on its position regarding Issue #1, the Employer
j stated at the hearing that if Issue #1 was decided in its favor, :
i
a.n Award on Issue #2 in favor of the Union would automatically
i
follow.
Under the Shenandoah contract the number of machines to be
handled by a seller-supervisor on "win...place...show" is limited to eight machines per seller-supervisor without defining the
type of machines

involved.

The Company concedes that that provision under the Shenandoah agreement, is more favorable to the Union than the Employer's interpretation of its own contract clause on that subject .
(Which the Employer interprets to apply only to straight wagering and not to multiple pool wagering, such as the trizacta.
Employer asserts that under its contract a limitation of eight
machines does not include the trizacta machine.)

The

ii
<
i

,
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ii

In view of the Employer's concession that ho is bound to
ii

the Shenandoah provision which is more favorable to the Union.,
I. see no need to decide whether a trizacta machine is or was
• i

" intended to be a machine included within the eight machine
|
|j limitation under the terms of the contract: between the Union
and the Employer,

Rather, based on the concession, and the

consequential preemptive status of the Shenandoah clause covering the pame subject the trizacta machine is included within
the eight machine limitation per seller-supervisor.
Accordingly the Union's grievance in Issue #2 is granted,
The Employer is required to limit the number of machines to be
supervised by any seller-supervisor to eight machines, even
though some of the machines supervised are trizacta machines.

Issue #3
The question here is whether the trizacta machine sellers
became "three-way sellers" after February 15, 1972 when they
;! were added to the bargaining unit and covered by the provisions
i|
i; of the February 15, 1972 agreement and the basic Collective Bargaining Agreement of November 27, 1967.
The Union contends that because trizacta wagering was
first instituted after the February 15, 1972 agreement, the employees covered by this grievance, when assigned that work became "three-way sellers" within the meaning of Schedule A of
the basic agreement.

And that by operation of Article VIII of

the February 15, 1972 agreement, those grievants are entitled
•ii to an additional $2.00 per night over their base pay for hand||
ij ling trizacta wagering pursuant to Schedule A of the basic con!! tract.

,
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The Employci

.1 tends Chat the wages of the grievants were

;|

fixed for the balance of the contract term under the Agreement
;; of February 15, 1972. It asserts that when added to the barIJ
H gaining unit those employees were granted wage increases of 50o
jj

per day for the work they were then performing which included

ij
i|

!:|

!

the exacta

and superfecta, both "exotic" types of wagering.

The Employer argues that the subsequently introduced trizacta

ij
I; wagering is basically no different than the exacta; that each

j

!i
j|

•

ji time a trizacta was introduced, an exacta race was eliminated;
j| '
;j and that consequently not only is there no significant differ-

I
,

i

ence in the handling of an exacta or trizacta bet, but that with

i

the elimination of the former in exchange for the latter the
|

total work load and responsibility of the affected employees
did not change.

|

I reject the Employer's argument.

Schedule A of the basic

Collective Bargaining Agreement applies, under the instant issue,
i
j

• '

to the type of work an employee performs, not to its quantity,
or to whether it is a lateral substitution for or change from

i
|
ii

the type of work previously performed.

i

It may well be that trizacta wagering requires no more
f
i

effort or responsibility than exacta wagering.

Yet Schedule A
;

makes no such express distinction.

It requires a wage differen-

tial between the two types of selling without any exception or
limitation.
When the grievants became part of the bargaining unit they
i

handled exacta and superfecta betting.
then "three-way Fellers."

Trizacta wagering was not at that

l|- time contemplated by both parties.

i!

As such they were not

j
|

i

I

i

:

Hence the 50<: a day wage
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increase could not have be?en intended to cover trizacta waeero
ing.

Instead it was a wage increa.se applicable to exacta and
i

s u p e r f e c t a \selling which the grievants were then performing,
>

and additionally, as the Union asserts, a wage increase commensurate with what others received by virtue of coverage under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Sometime later (apparently in April 1972) the trizacta was
introduced.

Trizacta is a "three-way sale" machine.

ators perforce became "three-way sellers."

Its oper-

At that point, for

the first time, the grievants acquired new contractual characteristics which they did not possess when they became part of the

j
i

bargaining unit.

Whether or not their new assignment was any

more demanding than xvhat they previously performed, it was nonetheless different in type.
,
jj

They became "three-way sellers,"

,

rather than exclusively "two-way sellers," and because the contract does not exempt any three-way sellers from the wage pay- .
ments set forth in Schedule A, the grievants are entitled to the I
i
pay contractually accorded that type of employee.
Accordingly the grievants under this issue who are trizacta
machine sellers are entitled to $2.00 per night over their base
pay as "three-way sellers."

the Union's grievance is granted.

Eric fi. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: December^ 1972
STATE of New York )
COUNTY of New York)
On this i J
day of December, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the fore
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
|

i!

FRANK T. ZOTTO
Notary Public, Srara of i !e.w York
No. 4 1 - 9 8 1 1450
Qualified in Ct'?ens County
Commission Expires Morcn 30, 1 974

ERIC J-VSCHMERTZ

December 11, 1972

Harold Israelson, Esq.
Israel son & Streit
521 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

- and -

John Finneran, Esq.
Mark Grossman. Esq.
Office of Labor Relations
City of New York
250 Broadway
New York, Kf'.Y. 10007

Re;

Case #1-92-72
City of N.Y. & Civil Service
Bar Association

Gentlemen:
As Chairman of the Impasse Panel designated by the Office of
Collective Bargaining in the above-numbered case, I enclose
herewith two signed copies of the report and recommendations
of the Impasse Panel for the settlement of the contract between the parties for the contract term January I/ 1972
through December 31, 1973.
Very trKfly yours,

Eric J / Schrnertz
Chaarman
ec
encl.

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPASSE
- BetweenCITY OF NEW YORK
1-92-72
-and-

CIVIL SERVICE BAR ASSOCIATION

BEFORE:

ERIC SCHMERTZ, Chairman
EVA ROBINS,. Member
GEORGE MA-RLIN, Member

On August 3, 1972, the above panel was named by joint request
of the parties to resolve the impasse between them pursuant to
Section 1173^7.0 of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law.

ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Term of Contract
2. Reclassification of Titles
3. Salaries

This Fact-Finding proceeding involves approximately 450"
attorneys employed by the City in various departments and
agencies. The Association represents employees with the
titles of Attorney-Trainee, Assistant Attorney, Attorney,
Senior Attorney, and Supervising Attorney.
The previous agreement expired December 31, 1970, and
the Panel is asked to make recommendations for a new agreement
effective January 1, 1971.
The Association desired to present additional issues to
the Panel. However, the City challenged the -Panel's authority
to hear and make recommendations on such issues because the
issues were either City-wide in scope or non-mandatory subjects
of bargaining. The Panel advised the Association that any
issues other than those mutually agreed upon, would have to be
submitted to the Board of Collective Bargaining to determine
their bargainability.
The Association reserved its right to raise those issues
held bargainable by the Board at a future date, and with this
reservation, the parties agreed to proceed with the hearings on
the three issues above.
1.

TERM OF CONTRACT

The Association has proposed a contract term of twenty
seven months for the period commencing January 1, 1971 and terminating March 31, 1973. The City has proposed a contract term
of three years, from January 1, 1971 to December 31, 1973.
The Panel is of the opinion that a three year contract
term is justified, based on the pattern of settlements for other
Career and Salary Plan employees as well as a desire to encourage
harmonious relations between the parties. It is now December 1972,
and little purpose would be served by a contract that would expire
in three months. Neither the public interest nor the interest of
the parties would be served by a contract .term of shorter duration.
2.

RECLASSIFICATION OF TITLES

Under the existing statutes,this Panel is limited to
making recommendations to the New York City Civil Service Commission
concerning reclassification of titles.
Both parties have recommended a reduction in the number
of the attorney titles. Presently there exists in addition to
Attorney Trainee and the managerial attorney classifications, the
following titles:
Assistant Attorney, Attorney, Senior Attorney and Supervising
Attorney.
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On the basis of the thorough presentation of both parties,
the Panel is persuaded that some type of reclassification of
titles is warranted.
In essence,
encompassing the
Attorney titles,
duties of Senior

both parties urge that there be a single title
duties of the current Assistant Attorney and
and likewise, a single title encompassing the
Attorney and Supervising Attorney.

However the method chosen by the parties.to effectuate
this change differs.
The Association has proposed that in each instance, the
lower title be eliminated, the incumbents in said titles be
advanced to the higher level, so that all attorneys are paid at
the higher level. The effect of this proposal is that the
incumbents of the lower title would move to the higher level • .
and newly hired attorneys would be hired at the minimum of the
higher title.
The Ci'ty proposes consolidation of- heretofore separate
classifications rather than the elimination of either lower
title.. The result of the consolidation would be a salary range
spanning the minimum of the lower titles to the maximum of the
higher titles.
The City proposes that incumbents of the lower titles
receive a promotional increase as a result of the consolidation.
Newly hired attorneys would be hired at the minimum of the range.
The Panel will recommend that the four titles be consolidated into two titles with certain salary adjustments to flow as
a consequence of the consolidation. Clearly a consolidation of
duties will allow more flexibility of assignment and maximize
the performance of attorneys/and at the same time facilitate
promotional opportunity.
The Panel's recommendation of the salary adjustment to flow
as a consequence of the proposed consolidation is discussed in
Section 3-Salaries, - below.
3.

SALARIES

It is undisputed that salary increases are warranted for
the attorneys represented by the Civil Service Bar Association.
Clearly the pre-1971 salary levels are far below the present
salaries of attorneys of comparable competence and experience
in the public and private sectors.
While it is true that the 'job opportunities for lawyers
have narrowed in recent years and that recuitment may or may not
-be as significant a problem in the future, there has 'been a considerable turnover of attorneys employed by the City.
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Both parties have expressed dissatisfaction with the
present structure of salaries for attorneys. The City argues
that there is no apparent structure within the present salary
scale, with attorneys "haphazardly" located in the ranges.
The City has argued that its lump sum proposal is the
only ''practicable" way of creating a rational wage structure.
It argues that its effects are "beneficial" and doesn't deny any
monies to the attorneys.
The Association adamantly opposed the lump sum payments
arguing the monies should be reflected in the rate, so as not to
deprive attorneys of pension benefits as well as the going-out
rate for the next round of collective bargaining.
The Panel notes that attorneys employed by the State and
Federal governments did not receive uniform salary -increases. The
increase was not uniform because the increases were dependent
upon 'the position of the attorneys in their respective increment
structures. .../-"Those attorneys who did not receive increments received significantly smaller increases than those who received
increments. •
. . . , - . . . ' .
In order to establish the structure proposed by both
'parties, from different viewpoints, with the Association requesting
Salaries and Structures of the State Pay Plan and the City advancing
a structure with a limited number of rates, we propose to establish
a structure by slotting employees at a fixed rate in the structure.
The Panel feels that this situation should be remedied to
bring order • to the salary scale. We agree that a rational salary
structure is essential and that a finite number of rates should be
recommended.
Additionally, the City's position that the Managerial Pay
Plan should be considered for the purposes of establishing maximum
salaries is valid. If the Panel were to do otherwise, it would
create a disruptive effect on the established Career and Salary
Plan for the entire program.
The Panel's recommendations will grant an equitable adjustment to this issue. It provides that every City Attorney shall
receive the same amount of dollars during each contract year as other
Attorneys in the same title.
The Association has ably demonstrated that the City's
salary proposals are inconsistent with action the City has taken with
regard to other Career and Salary Plan employees.
The City's proposal for the first year is consistent with the
pattern of settlement alleged, but not for the second and third year
increases because of concern for Pay Board guidelines. The Association
has justified larger increases for the second and third years for two
reasons: first, internal comparisons, i. e. negotiated
increases
for other Career and Salary Plan Employees, and second, external comparisons with other governmental jurisdictions.

-4INTERNAL COMPARISONS
First, and most important, other Career and Salary Plan
employees received higher increases. The Accountants, Clerical
.Employees, Hospital Employees, Investigators, Public Health
Nurses and Social Services Employees all received higher negotiated increases in the later year of their .contracts than the
City has offered the Attorneys in the second and third years.
The Panel feels that disparate treatment of the attorneys
as compared with the other Career and Salary Plan Employees would
have a deleterious effect on the labor policies .of the City. Additionally, the Panel seeks to avoid any "whipsaw" effect engen- dered by disparate increases.
The Panel has made its recommendations notwithstanding the
City's concern for Pay Board action. Our recommendation is
properly in line with the pattern of negotiated settlements for
the other Career and Salary Plan Employees.
..
.
EXTERNAL COMPARISONS
The Panel agrees that it is helpful to note comparisons
with the State and Federal governments. The City's proposals
for the second and third year are not comparable with the treatment of attorneys in other governmental jurisdictions.
During the hearings, the parties were agreed as to the appropriate equivalent State titles for comparison purposes except
for the Supervising Attorney title. The City argued that the
Panel must compare non-managerial titles. The Association's
witnesses testified that individuals with the State Supervising
Attorney title were upgraded into the managerial level.
In another proceeding, the Association established that the
City Supervising Attorney was not a managerial title, thereby retaining, the right to bargain for it. Accordingly, since there is
no one in the State performing legal work at Grade 30, the comparison sought by the Association, the appropriate grade for comparison purposes is Grade 28.
The appropriate State equations for comparison purposes
are:
City Title

State Title

Assistant Attorney
Attorney
Senior Attorney
Supervising Attorney

Attorney
Senior Attorney
Associate Attorney
Associate Attorney

SG
SG
SG
SG

19
24
28
28
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The parties also disputed the appropriate comparisons with
the Federal government. • The Association sought to link the Assistant
Attorney with an entrance level of GS 11. The City sought an entrance
level comparison of GS 9.
In 1971 State and Federal Attorneys received across-the- •
board increases of 6%. In 1972 the increases were 4% and 5.5%.
respectively. The Association correctly noted that some employees
received increments as well. Neither the Federal nor State Attorneys
received a uniform monetary increase. The monetary increase for the
City Attorney will be uniform, and each Attorney will receive the full
amount of the increase recommended.
The Panel has recommended an entrance salary which it believes is competitive with that of other Attorneys employed in the
public sector.
•
' .
"
Perforce, recommendations of increases in salary for
incumbents, and a salary structure within which those increases
are placed, must have some application to entrance salaries as
well. Additionally, we find a change in entrance salary
warranted"in comparison to entrance salaries .of other attorneys
employed in the public sector. We do so within the format
proposed by the City in its brief.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSED
CONSOLIDATION OF TITLES
The consolidation of titles recommended supra necessitate
salary adjustments to flow as a consequence of the proposed consolidation.
The proposed consolidation of titles will increase the duties
and responsibilities of the incumbents in the Assistant Attorney and
Senior Attorney titles. Upon consolidation a promotional increase .is
warranted. We have recommended that this.increase be granted according
to the schedule set forth in the recommendation.
Similarly, incumbents in the titles of Attorney and Supervising' Attorney will assume added responsibilities .of instruction for
a period of about one year. We have recommended that the Attorneys in
these titles receive additional remuneration for that year according
to the schedule set forth in our recommendation.
The Panel also recommends that a promotional guarantee be
provided for in the proposed rate structure. If an Attorney is promoted from the consolidated Assistant Attorney - Attorney title to
the consolidated Senior Attorney - Supervising Attorney title, he shall
be granted a promotional increase of $1100 plus whatever additional
suras would be required to move him to the next highest rate in the
structure in the consolidated Senior Attorney - Supervising Attorney
title.

PRODUCE

respect to the productivity language suggested,
• 1I18.1.
we recommend the adoption of the City's productivity proposal.
The Panel notes that the testimony of the Association is
replete with the fact that they have been already meeting the standards of the productivity language which shall be recommended in the
contract and should, therefore, be no additional burden to the
Association to adoot the City's oroductivity language. Productivity bargaining is an essential element in collective negotiations •
of the City of New York, as well as an important criterion for
Pay -Board determinations.

-7RE COMMENDAT IONS
1 . The term of the agreement shall be for a period of
three (.3) years commencing January 1, 1971 and terminating
December 31, 1973.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW YORK CITY
_
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION_
_
2. The Panel recommends that the titles of Assistant
Attorney and Attorney be consolidated into a single title encompassing the duties of the former titles. The Panel recommends
the consolidation of the titles of Senior Attorney and Supervising
Attorney in the same manner .
SALARIES
3 . a) Salaries and Ranges
. The Panel has recommended the adoption of the format
suggested by the City in its. brief.
( 1 ) Salary Increases
The salary increases recommended are as follows:
Effective Dates
1/1/73
1/1/71
1/1/72
Title
$1300
Assistant Attorney
$1200
$1200
1300
Attorney
1300
1300
1500
Senior Attorney
1400
1400
1500
Supervising Attorney
1500
1500
The full amount of the increase will not necessarily
be reflected in the rate of the individual attorney. The increase
may in whole or part be reflected in the rate, with the balance in
a lump sum cash payment dependent upon the position of the individual
attorney in the rate structure (See part (b) below) .
(2) Ranges
The new minimums and maximums recommended are as follows
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
$12,000 - $15,600
12,600 - 16,400
13,200 - 17,100

Effective 1/1/71
"
1/1/72
"
1/1/73*

* If the proposed consolidation takes place, the new range will be
$13,200 - $19,800.

ATTORNEY
$14,200 -$18,300
14,900 - 19,000
15,600 - 19,800
* The proposed consolidation will
Attorney range effective 1/1/73.

Effective 1/1/71
1/1/72
1/1/73*
have no effect on the

SENIOR ATTORNEY
$16,650 - $20,800
17,450 - 21,600
18,000 - 22,300

Effective 1/1/71
1/1/72
1/1/73*

* If the proposed consolidation takes place, the new range
will be $18,000 - $25,200.
SUPERVISING ATTORNEY
$19,000
20,000
21,000

- $23,600
- 24,600
- 25,200

Effective 1/1/71
!;
.- 1/1/72
1/1/73*

* The proposed consolidation will have no effect on the
Supervising Attorney range effective 1/1/73.
b.

Structure of the Increase

The structure of the increases is set forth in the Appendix
annexed to the Panel's report. The range for each title has been
divided into '"subgroups'1. The individual's subgroup shall be determined by his rate and title as of December 31 in each year. The
amoun.t and form of the increase he shall receive is determined by
moving laterally along the line for his subgroup. Under no circumstances can the rate payable exceed the fixed rate for the
particular subgroup. In the event that the increase recommended would
result in a rate exceeding the fixed rate for the subgroup, the
attorney shall receive the fixed rate for the subgroup and the balance
of the scheduled increase in the form of a lump sum payment in cash.
The lump sum payment shall not be considered as part of
the rate for pension purposes and under no circumstances is it to be
construed as a continuing obligation.
c. Increases for Attorneys hired at the
minimum rate after December 31, 1970
The hiring or minimum rates for the respective titles are
set forth in the annexed Appendix. Under no circumstances shall
the increases recommended result in a rate exceeding the fixed rate
established for the respective effective date. In the event that

-9the scheduled increase for Attorneys hired at the minimum rats
results in a rate exceeding the fixed rate, the Attorney shall
receive the fixed rate and the balance of the scheduled increase
in the form of a lump sum payment in cash.
For example, the minimum rate for an Assistant Attorney,
hired after January 1, 1972 but prior to December 31, 1972, is
$12,600. The scheduled increase effective January 1, 1973 is
$1,300. This individual will receive a $900 increase to the fixed
rate (to $13,500) and $400 in the form of a lump sum cash payment.
d.

Salary Adjustments Due to
Consolidation of Titles

-

The Panel has recommended that upon consolidation, attorneys
in the titles of Assistant Attorney and Senior Attorney shall receive
an increase of $900 and $1,100 respectively.
In the case of an Assistant Attorney hired at the minimum
after January 1, 1973, he shall receive upon consolidation a rate
increase of $600 and a lump sum cash payment of $300, for a total
of $900.
In the case of a Senior Attorney at the minimum rate after
January 1, 1973, he shall receive an increase of $600 to his rate and
a lump sum cash payment of $500, for a total of $1,100.
Upon consolidation, incumbents in the title of Attorney and
Supervising Attorney shall receive cash payments of $900 and $1,100
respectively, as compensation for instruction, for the upgraded
attorneys in the consolidated titles.
The cash payments shall be paid in accordance with the
following schedule:
ATTORNEYS
$450 three months subsequent to the date on which the
first Assistant Attorney is reclassified
-and$450 six months subsequent to the date on which the
first six Assistant Attorneys are reclassified.
SUPERVISING

ATTORNEYS

$550 three months subsequent to the date on which the
first Senior Attorney is reclassified.
-and$550 six months subsequent to the date on which the
first six Senior Attorneys are reclassified.
There is no dispute between the parties- as to promotional
guarantees for the period prior to consolidation. However, if an
attorney is promoted from the consolidated Assistant Attorney-Attorney
title to the consolidated Senior Attorney-Supervising Attorney title,
he shall be granted a promotional increase of $1,100 plus whatever
additional suTfis will be required to move him to the next highest rate
in the structure of the consolidated Senior Attorney-Supervising Attorney
title.
• - . ' . - . ' ,^
....
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e • P roduc t i-vi ty B argai ning
The Panel recommends that the parties adopt the following
contract language:
" Delivery of municipal services in the most efficient/ effective and courteous manner is of paramount importance to the City
and the Union. Such achievement is recognized to be a mutual obligation of both parties within their respective roles and responsibilities. To achieve and maintain a high level of effectiveness,
the parties hereby agree to the following terms:
Section 1. - Performance Levels
a. The Union recognizes the City's right under the
New York City Collective Bargaining Lav; to establish and/or revise
performance standards or norms notwithstanding the existence .of
prior performance levels, norms or standards. Such standards, developed by usual work measurement procedures, may be used to determine acceptable performance levels, prepare work schedules and to
measure the performance of each employee or group, of employees. 'For
the purpose of this Section, the Union may, under Section 1173-4,3b
of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law, assert to the City
and/or the Board of Collective Bargaining during the term of this
agreement that the City's decisions on the foregoing matters have a
practical impact' on employees, within the meaning of the Board of
Collective Bargaining's Decision No. B-9-68. The City will give
the Union prior notice of the establishment and/or revision of performance standards or norms hereunder.
b. Employees who work at less than acceptable levels of
performance may be subject to disciplinary measures in accordance
with applicable law.
Section 2. - Supervisory Responsibi1ity
The Union recognizes the City's right under the New York City
Collective Bargaining Law to establish and/or revise standards for
supervisory responsibility in achieving and maintaining performance
levels of supervised employees for employees in supervisory positions
listed in Article III, Section 3 of this contract. For the purposes
of this Section, the Union may, under Section 1173-4.3b of the
New York City Collective Bargaining Law, assert to -the City and/or
the Board of Collective Bargaining 'during the term of this agreement
that the City's decisions on the foregoing matters have a practical
impact on employees, within the meaning of the Board of Collective
Bargaining's Decision No. B-9-68. The City will give the Union
prior notice of the establishment and/or revision of standards for
supervisory responsibility hereunder. Employees who fail to meet
such standards may be subject to disciplinary measures in accordance
with applicable law."
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ERIC J./SCHMERTZ, "Chaafman

"EVA ROBINS , Member

Dated: New York, New York
December 11', 1972

__
GEORGE

Increase

New Rates

CONSOLIDATION

Increase

New Rates Increase

New Rates

Increase

Assistant
Attorney
(f)H. Rate:12000
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

11400-11949
11950-12449
12450--13049
13050-14049
14050 and over

*1200

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

12600-13149
13150-13649
13650-14249
14250-15249
15250-15600

(h) Hiring Rate: 13200
| 13500
14100
(f )

(g) Hiring Rate: 12600
(f)
13200
*1200

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

13800-14349
14350-14849
14850-15449
15450-16000
16400

*1300

(c)

(d)

*1300

(a) 14800-15374
(b) 15375-16024
(c) 16025-16674
(d) 16675-17199
(e) 17200-18300

*1300

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

16100-16674
16675-17324
17325-17974
17975-18499
18500-19000

14700
15300
15900
16500
17100

*900

(h) Hiring Rate: 15600
16200
(g)
16800
(f ) •

(g) Hiring Rate: 14900
(f)
15500

(f)H. Rate:14200
13500-14074
14075-14724
14725-15374
15375-15899
15900 and over

'

(e)

Attorney

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

(a)
(b)

*1300

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

17400
18000
18600
19200
19800

(e)

*900

Senior Attorney
(g) Hiring Rate: 17450
(f)
18050

(a)
(b)
(c
(d)
(e)

15850-16699
16700-17374
17375-17999
18000-18499
18500 and over

*1400

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

17250-18099
18100-18774
18775-19399
19400-19899
19900-20800

*1400

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

18650-19499
19500-20000
20175-20550
20800-21299
21300-21600

*1500

(a) 18100-18499
(b) 18500-20399
(c) 20400-21249
(d) 21250-22099
(e) 22100 and over

*1500

(a) 19600-19999
(b) 20000-21899
(c) 21900-22749
(d) 22750-23000
(e) 23600

(g) Hiring Rate: 20000
(f)
20500
*1500

(a) 21100-21499
(b) 21500-22800
- 23400
(c)
(d) 23950-24000
- 24600
(e)

18700
19300

(a)
(b)
(c)

19900
20500
21100
2170O
22300

(d)
(e)

Supervising
Attorney
(f)H. Rate: 19.000

S
g!
(f)

*1500

'

*1100

(a)
(c)
(d)

(e)

* Except where modified by schedule, in which case the difference will be made up by lump sura.

22800
23400
24000
24600
25200

13200
13800
14400
15000

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

15600
16200
16?CO
17400
18000

(h)
(g)
(f)

15600
16200
16800

(a)
(b)
(c)'
(d)
(e)

17400
18000
18600
19200
198CO

(a)
(b)
(c)
(e)

21000
21600
22200
22800
23400

(h)
(g)
(f)

21000
216CO
22200

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

22800
23400
24000
24600
25200

(d)

(h) Hiring Rate: 21000
21600
(g)
22200
U)

(b)

(i } Hiring Rate :
(h)
(g)
(f)

(i) Hiring Rate: 18000
(h)
18600
(19200)
19800
(g)
20400
(f)

(h) Hiring Rate: 18000
(f)H. Rate: 16650.

New Rates

*1100

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
!

Local 210 International Brotherhood
of Teamsters

'
'

and

'
i
'
i

Continental Connector Corporation

Award
and
Opinion

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of Marion
Smith? If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on December 30, 1971 at which time Mrs.
Smith, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the above named Union and Company, hereinafter
referred to jointly as the "parties,11 appeared, and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties express-

ly waived the Arbitrator's oath.
The grievant was discharged for excessive absenteeism.
The rule in such cases is well settled.

Discharge is proper

where an employee continues a record of excessive absenteeism
following warnings and/or lesser penalties; where the absenteeism is chronic and due to conditions or circumstances which
appear unlikely to change, even if beyond the employee's control.

This rule is based on the equally well settled principle

that an employer, in order to maintain production schedules or
to perform his services, is entitled to the prompt and regular attendance of his employees; and that where an employee
cannot meet that obligation for whatever reason, his employ-

- 2 ment may be terminated.
The facts in the instant case meet the foregoing test.
There is no serious dispute over the excessive nature of the
grievant's record of absenteeism, so it need not be detailed
here.

The evidence indicates that her absences were due prim-

arily to illness, especially an arthritic condition.

Though

it does not appear that that record was due to any willful
or
neglect of her job/that the illnesses were false or misrepresented, there is nevertheless no real indication that her physical condition has or will improve.

Hence I must conclude that

because her condition is chronic, her record of absenteeism,
if she returns to work, will continue excessive and unsatisfactory.

In short, though the circumstances appear to be beyond

her control and though she cannot be found at fault or guilty
of misconduct, there is no reasonable basis upon which to
assume that she will be able to give the Company the kind of
attendance it may properly require.
Also the discharge in this case was the end result of the
application of "progressive discipline" as required in such
matters.

The grievant received a series of warnings over a

period of more than three years; and was clearly told that her
job was in jeopardy if her absentee record failed to improve.
Though a short term improvement was recorded at one point, her
overall record despite and following the warnings failed of
improvement on a significant or permanent basis.
Accordingly, inasmuch as the facts in this case square
with the traditional rule upholding the propriety of discharge

- 3 for excessive absenteeism, I must sustain the Company's action.
Mitigation of that penalty, either because the grievant's absences were beyond her control or fault; or for any other reason upon which she might be given another chance, are for matters for the consideration of the Company - not the Arbitrator,
Accordingly the Undersigned having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Marion Smith is upheld,

'sGUspMte

Eric JJ Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: February 2, 1972
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York) " " "
On this 2nd day of February, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 210 IBT
Award

and

and
Opinion

Continental Connector Corp.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of Golfo
Tsoulos? If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on July 14, 1972 at which time Miss
Tsoulos, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
I am not persuaded that the grievant did not or could not
understand, from the instructions and demonstrations of her foreman, that she was not to move the fan and pre-heater during the
course of production on June 6, 1972.

And even if because of an

alleged language barrier there be some doubt whether she understood what he meant, I believe she must have understood what was
expected of her, when later that day, she received a written warning from the Personnel Manager, at a formal meeting in his office,
for failing or refusing to comply with the foreman's instructions.
At that meeting an interpreter was used to tell her what she was
doing wrong and though there is dispute over whether the interpreter was precise, the use of an interpreter must have impressed
the grievant with the seriousness of the situation.

That she again

- 2 without inquiring further^ failed to comply with these instructions after receiving the written warning can only be construed
as an act of defiance0
However the grievant has been employed 4-1/2 years without any prior blemish on her record.

The absence of any prior

discipline leads me to believe that what took place on June 6,
1972, though not excused, may have been an isolated incident,,
Accordingly I think it appropriate to give the grievant the
mitigating benefit of her prior spotless record, and in this
instance to reduce the penalty from discharge to a suspension.
Accordingly the Undersigned Arbitrator, having been duly
designated in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement between
the above named parties, dated April 9, 1971, and having been
duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the parties makes the following
AWARD:
The discharge of Golfo Tsoulos is reduced to a
disciplinary suspension.
She shall be reinstated
without back pay and the period of time from her
discharge to her reinstatement shall be deemed a
disciplinary suspension for refusing to comply
with instructions of her foreman and failing to
heed a formal warning. Any further such offense
would be grounds for her discharge.

Eric /J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: August 1 1972
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) ':
On this
day of August, 1972 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

Case No. 1330 0633 72

1
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 210 International Brotherhood
of Teamsters
Award
and
Continental Connector Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The discharge of Dorothy Lee Brown Walley is reduced
to a disciplinary suspension. She shall be reinstated but without back pay. The period from discharge
to reinstatement shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension for an unsatisfactory attendance record. She
is on notice that unless that record shows immediate
improvement and becomes and remains satisfactory, she
would be subject to summary discharge.

Eric J/ 'Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: APril L 1972
STATE OF New York )gs
COUNTY OF New York)
On this a day of April, 1972, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 210 International Brotherhood
of Teamsters
Opinion
and
Continental Collector Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Dorothy Lee Brown Walley? If not what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on February 18, 1972 at which time Mrs.
Walley, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the above named Union and Company, hereinafter
referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared.

All concern-

ed were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties

expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath0
The grievant was discharged because of excessive tardiness and absenteeism.
It is clear and well settled, as I stated in an earlier
Award between the parties, that the Company is not required
to indefinitely tolerate excessive absenteeism or other irregular attendance by an employee.
However, in the instant case, though over a three year
period from 1969 until May of 1970 the grievant's record of
attendance and punctuality has not been satisfactory, I am
persuaded that there are mitigating circumstances which warrant
a reduction in the penalty.

- 2 The grievant's principal offense for the total period
has been tardiness in reporting to work.

Her absentee record

showed some discernible improvement in 1971.

But for her con-

tinuing inability to report to work on time I think she may
not have been discharged.
Chronic excessive tardiness, standing alone, is also
grounds for termination if it continues following imposition
of lesser penalties pursuant to a progressive discipline formula.

However, in the instant case I conclude that some of

the circumstances surrounding the grievant's tardiness were
not only beyond her control, but were due to a temporary condition, namely pregnancy, no longer present.

I am satisfied

that this condition and its attendant illnesses were responsible for a portion of her tardiness.

Hence there is reason

to believe that her record should and can improve.

Also, many

of her latenesses were a matter of minutes, which though not
excused or excusable, are not as serious or disruptive to the
Company's operation as if they had been of greater duration or
if she had not reported to work at all.
Finally, and perhaps most important at least to my mind,
is that offenses of this type should be subjected to a disciplinary suspension step within a progressive discipline formula.

By losing time from work without pay, an employee is

impressed with the seriousness of the offense and the Company's
dissatisfacttion with his record.

Subjected to a temporary

removal from the payroll, an offending employee is given the
most unequivocal notice short of discharge that he must re-

- 3 habilitate himself to retain his job.

I am not persuaded that

a warning notice alone, not matter how many, can impress an
employee that his job is in jeopardy if his record does not
markedly improve.

And that is why most arbitrators require an

intermediate step between warnings and discharge, namely a
disciplinary suspension - in cases where summary discharge is
not warranted.
In my judgment this case, which involves primarily tardiness rather than absenteeism, and where the tardiness in many
instances was for short periods of time, and conceivably in
some others the result of pregnancy, falls within that general
rule.
Accordingly I shall reduce the grievant's penalty of
discharge to a suspension.

She shall be reinstated but with-

out back pay, and the period of time from discharge to reinstatment shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension.

She is on

notice that unless her attendance record shows immediate improvement and becomes and remains satisfactory, she would be
subject to summary discharge.

X

/

Eric J/ S chme r t z
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 584 IBT
Award

and

and
Opinion

Delltown Foods, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Has the Company violated Section 8(e) of the contract dated November 11, 1972 to November 11, 1973
by distributing milk in the Metropolitan area
which was processed by employees who were not working under the contract in the said Metropolitan area?
If so what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on July 24, 1972 at which time representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
Section 8(e) of the contract reads:
In order to protect the job opportunities and labor
standards of all employees covered by the Milk Industry Collective Bargaining Agreement, it is agreed
that all whole fluid milk distributed in the Metropolitan Area by the Employers covered by this Agreement
(including whole fluid milk delivered to or picked up
by any other dealer or person for ultimate distribution within the Metropolitan Area, whether or not the
point of sale or delivery by the Employer is within
the Metropolitan Area) must be bottled, packaged, pasteurized and processed (herein referred to as "processed") by employees working under this Agreement in
the said Metropolitan Area....
The evidence discloses that in order to obtain milk packaged in gallon plastic containers to service a particular customer in the Metropolitan Area, the Company has been purchas-

- 2 ing milk processed and so packaged from Johanna Farms, a New
Jersey enterprise not covered by the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the parties herein and whose employees are
not working under said Collective Agreement.
Therefore, irrespective of the Company's business needs to
obtain milk in plastic containers, its distribution in the Metropolitan Area of milk bought or obtained from Johanna Farms is
and has been violative of Section 8(e) of the contract.

The

Arbitrator's authority is limited to interpreting and enforceing the contract.
Accordingly having been duly designated in accordance with
the contract, and having been duly sworn and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the parties, I make the following
AWARD:
The Company is in violation of Section 8(e) of the
contract by distributing milk in the Metropolitan
area which was processed by employees who were not
working under the contract in the said Metropolitan
Area. The Company is directed to forthwith cease
and desist from distributing in the Metropolitan Area
milk obtained from Johanna Farms of New Jersey.

Eric J/'Schmertz
Arbitrator

f>

DATED: August 23, 1972
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 23rd day of August 23, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same„
Case No. 1330 0620 72

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 3036 New York City Taxi
Drivers Union
AWARD:
and

Essex Garage

The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman between the above
named parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the Union, the Employer having failed to appear at the hearing on August 3, 1972 after due notice, makes the following
AWARD:
Essex Garage owes those employees whose names
appear on Schedule A attached hereto and made
a part hereof, vacation and severance pay in
the amounts listed on said Schedule0
Essex Garage is directed to forthwith pay said
amounts to said employees, or to the Union on
behalf of said employees.

Eric >/. Schtnertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: August
1972
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York) "'
On this
day of August, 1972 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same0

FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Elevator
Constructors, Local #1

Award

and

Kiesling Elevator Company
The Undersigned, having been duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having been duly sworn, and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the Union, and the Company having failed to appear after due notice, makes the following AWARD:
For the period May 2 through July 25, 1971, Kiesling
Elevator Company owes Edward Kampertnan vacation pay
in the amount of $150.64. Kiesling Elevator Company
is directed to pay said amount to Edward Kamperman or
to the Union on his behalf, forthwith.
For ten days in June 1971 and nine days in July 1971
Kiesling Elevator owes the Union's Annuity Fund for
employee Edward Kamperman the sum of $123.00. Kiesling Elevator Company is directed to pay said sum to
the Union forthwith.
The Arbitrator's fee of $200.00 shall be shared equally by the parties. Therefore Kiesling Elevator Company
shall pay to the Union the additional sum of $100.00
representing its share of the Arbitrator's fee paid by
the Union.

Eric /. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 27, 1972
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 27th day of November, 1972, before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
the same„
Case No. 73K 00929

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 3036 New York City Taxi
Drivers Union
AWARD
and
Essex Garage
The Undersigned as Impartial Chairman between the above
named parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the Union, the Employer having failed to appear at the hearing on August 3, 1972 after due notice, makes the following
AWARD:
Essex Garage owes those employees whose names
appear on Schedule A attached hereto and made
a part hereof, vacation pay in the amounts listed on said Schedule.
Essex Garage owes those employees whose names
appear on Schedule B attached hereto and made
a part hereof, severance pay in the amounts listed on said Schedule.
Essex Garage is directed to forthwith pay said
amounts to said employees, or to the Union on behalf of said employees.

Eric <T. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: September
1972
STATE OF New York ),ss. :
COUNTY OF New York)'
On this
day of September, 1972 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.

SCHEDULE A - VACATION
Abromovici, M.
Andreotti, E.
Ashkenas, M.
Beauregard, J.
Behar, L.
Bills, F.
Black, B.
Burger, P.
Butler, J.
Callen, T.
Carmona
Chinea, A.
Clunie, C.
Cohen, B.
Cohen, R.
Colon, F.
DeMaio, G.
Epstein, N.
Fisher, L.
Friedman, L.
Galarza, J.
Gambino, J.
Garry A.
Gatanio, G.
Glantz, N.
Gomberg, M.
Gonzalez, Jose
Gonzalez, J.
Greenberg, B.
Gorkin
Henning, R.
Herzfeld, M.
Hirsch, H.
Hoffman, L.
Hymson, H.
Jacobs, S.
Johnson, A.
Kerrigan, J.
Kerman, D.
Krupnik, P.
Kutner, J.
Latampo, N.
Lawrence, M.
Lefevre, F.
Lenz, A.
Littman, I.

$127.29
414.22
164.22
29.77
64.45
181.74
228.75
62.57
227.67
445.35
224.44
217.50
86.23
74.79
199.35
89.31
176.04
182.62
243.58
117.27
174.02
54.94
79.50
79.99
171.12
141.90
37.19
118.05
164.69
31.20
194.42
173.73
145.96
87.70
303.72
74.23
241.62
190.34
143.36
113.96
257.16
65.42
302.67
112.87
54.46
285.24

Vacation

- 2 -

Lombardo, M.
London, S.
McHale, C.
McDonnell, M.
Mclaughlin, J.
Meisner, W.
Mendola, N.
Novstropovlas, J.
Nardone, A.
Negrow, L.
Nestel, H.
Newman, J.
Oppenheim, R.
Poppadoupoulas, H.
Parker, A.
Perkarsky, J.
Perle, R.
Piwet, R.
Pittel, M.
Pryor, C.
Rachelson, H.
Ramirez, H.
Rindsberg, E.
Rivera, A.
Robinson, A.
Rolon, A.
Rosado, J.
Rosen, A.
Rothfeld, B.
Salzman, B.
Schneider, S.
Schutner, J.
Schwartz, A.
Segall, C.
Shindler, M.
Sierra, I.
Slater, H.
Speck, A.
Steinhauer, D.
Strauss, P.
Sunshine, A.
Sussman, J.
Sussman, M.
Tandlich, H.
Thomas, C.

75.33
211.02
77.50
193.72
128.92
177.80
165.22
73.99
172.18
144.96
238.30
185.72
70.64
124.76
156.80
206.70
136.45
94.13
180.56
167.16
160.05
155.70
198.18
82.91
203.26
148.94
67.76
64.03
269.22
263.58
70.95
410.01
151.74
320.46
164.32
99.12
75.21
137.78
196.62
179.66
75.20
291.45
51.24
117.37
136.72

Trager, L.

192.06

Vacation
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growers, E.
Velezbaloy, C.
Vendis, C.
Vicker, J.
Viscovic, E.
Wasserman, B.
Way, J.
Weinstein, H.
Weinstein, S.
Williams, D.
Williams, R.
Young A.
Zeidman, D.
Zudiker S.

41.75
33.84
71.28
139.68
155.92
279.39
39.32
243.93
182.22
196.10
30.76
210.60
70.83
130.14
Inside Men

Colon, M.
Heller, F.
Luces, A.
Benjamin, S.
Figueroa, J.
Smit^i, R.
Davis, J.
Miller, J.

210.00
300.00
300.00
270.00
384.00
260.00
260.00
170.00

SCHEDULE B - SEVERANCE
Abromovici, M.
Andreotti, E.
Ashkenas, M.
Beauregard, J.
Behar, L.
Bills, F.
Black, B.
Burger, P.
Butler, J.
Callen, I.
Carmona
Chinea, A.
Clunie, C.
Cohen, B.
Cohen, R.
Colon, F.
DeMaio, G.
Epstein, N.
Fisher, L.
Friedman, L.
Galarza, J.
Gambino, J.
Garry, A.
Gatanio, G.
Glantz, N.
Gomberg, M.
Gonzalez, Jose
Negrun, L.
Nester, H.
Newman, J.
Oppenheimer, R.
Pappadoupoulas, H.
Parker, A.
Pekarsky, J.
Perle, R.
Pinet, R.
Pittel, M.
Pryor, C.
Rachelson, H.
Ramirez, H.
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
Between
Frank Palumbo and Joseph LaFemina,
as Members of the Board of Trustees
of Firemen's Variable Supplements Fund
and
Joseph J. Perrini and Richard C. Bluestine '
as Members of the Board of Trustees of
'
said Fund
'
i
and
'
T

OPINION
and
AWARD

John J. O'Reilly and Joseph G. Phalen, Jr.,'
as Members of the Board of Trustees of
'
Fire Office^Sk Variable Supplements Fund
'
and
Joseph J. Perrini and Richard C. Bluestine '
as Members of the Board of Trustees of
'
said Fund
'

The stipulated issue is:
The Trustees of the Funds having been deadlocked
on whether to adopt by resolution proposed regulations marked as Exhibit A and Exhibit B in the
record. The Arbitrator is authorized pursuant
to Sections B 19-42.Od and B 19-62.Od of the Administrative Code to decide which proposed regulation
is to be adopted by the Boards of Trustees of said
Funds.
A hearing was held on July 21, 1972 at which time representatives of the above named parties appeared. All concerned
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
oath was expressly waived.

The Arbitrator's

The parties filed post hearing

briefs.
For convenience, Messrs. Palumbo, LaFemina, O'Reilly and
Phalen will hereinafter be referred to as the Unions' Trustees;

-2and Messrs. Perrini and Bluestine will hereinafter be referred
to as the City Trustees.

The Firemen's and Fire Officer's

Funds, shall hereinafter be referred to as "the Funds".

Exhibit A and Exhibit B, proposed respectively by the
Unions' and City's Trustees, over which the Trustees are
deadlocked, read:
EXHIBIT A

Section 11. STAFF AND FACILITIES. In addition
to the staff provided pursuant to Subdivision f of
Section B19-42.0 of the Code, by the Fire Commissioner,
the Board shall employ such administrative, legal or
expert assistance as it deems necessary, and further,
the Board shall lease premises and purchase or lease
materials, supplies and equipment as it shall deem
necessary.
EXHIBIT B

Section 11. ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF. Pursuant to
Subdivision f of Section B19-62.0 of the Code, the
Fire Commissioner shall assign to the Variable
Supplements Fund Board such number of clerical and
other assistants as many be necessary for the performance of its functions.
Clerical and other assistants
assigned to such Board shall not receive, directly
and indirectly, any pay or emolument from the Variable
Supplements Fund for their services.

The Arbitrator's authority stems from the express provisions of the statutes referred to in the stipulated issue,
As to both Funds, said Sections read:
In the event that the votes of at least three
members of such board are not cast in favor of
any resolution proposed, such dispute shall be
promptly referred to the arbitrator, designated,
for the purpose of resolving such disputes, in
the collective bargaining agreement then in effect
between the city and the association. Such arbitrator
shall determine such dispute as expeditiously as
possible and his determination shall be adopted by
the board.

-3At the end of the hearing, counsel for the parties
stated that they viewed the dispute as a "legal matter",
meaning as I see it that the Arbitrator was not to determine
the wisdom or need, of the respective proposed regulations
over which the Trustees deadlocked, but whether, as the City
Trustees contend, the regulation proposed by the Union's
Trustees should be rejected on the grounds of "illegalityI'.
(Indeed, the former considerations, namely whether a proposed
resolution is improvident, wise or necessary, is and should
be within the exclusive jurisdiction

of the Trustees.)

A determination of the "legal question" turns on an interpretation of the statutes which established the Funds, namely
Chapter 887, Articles 5 and 6 of the Laws of New York (Joint
Exhibit #1).
To vest such authority in an Arbitrator is unusual.

Ordin-

arily the Arbitrator's role is to interpret and apply a
Collective Bargaining Agreement, and it is for the courts or
an appropriate agency to interpret and apply legislation and
statutes.

But here, by legislative act, and by the express

statutory provisions set forth in the stipulated issue, the
Arbitrator is empowered to resolve the deadlocked disputes of
the Trustees.
Manifestly, that means he is authorized to interpret the
applicable statutory provisions.

The issue as stipulated by

the parties is confirmation of this authority.

-4Moreover, I conclude that a resolution of the deadlock
is to be found within the four corners of the statutes establishing the Funds,

and that the "legislative history",

namely the collective bargaining negotiations is immaterial.

The statutes establishing the Funds are comprehensive.
Clearly, the negotiations between the Unions and the City regarding the substantive aspects of the Funds were merged in
the legislation.

The collective bargaining negotiations did not themselves
create the Funds.

What the Unions and the City did in collective

bargaining was to agree to take the necessary steps to bring
the Funds into existence.

Thereafter legislation was necessary.

The powers, purpose, and operation of the Funds are fixed and
determined by the enabling legislation.

Indeed this was clear-

ly recognized and contemplated by the Unions and the City in
collective bargaining.

Sections 1 and 2 of Article VII of the

then applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement between the City
and the Uniformed Firefighters Association reads: (Emphasis added
Section 1 - The City and the Union agree to sponsor
mutually agreed-upon legislation in the State Legislature to provide certain improvements in pension
benefits as listed below.
Section 2 - Notwithstanding the provisions of this
Article the provisions of such legislation shall be
deemed to have implemented and shall supersede the
provisions of this Article, and no rights shall accrue
under the provisions of this Article different from or
in addition to the rights accruing under such legislation. If such legislation is adopted, any dispute
concerning the interpretation and/or application of
the provisions of this Article, shall not be subject
to the disputes adjustment or grievance procedures set
forth in this Contract.
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Additionally, as a matter of law, the City and Unions'
Trustees of the Fund are separate entities from the Union
and City as parties to the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Therefore the Trustees cannot be unconditionally bound by
what the City and the Unions negotiated or said to each other
in the course of the negotiations for the collective agreement.
The office of Trustee was not in existence when the contract
was negotiated, nor was it established by those negotiations.
Rather that office and the powers and duties attached to it
first came into being as a result of the subsequent legislation,

Moreover, based on the record before me, I do not find
much persuasive evidence on way or the other that in the course
of the collective bargaining negotiations the Unions and the
City discussed in detail, let alone agreed on the substance of
either or both of the proposed regulations (Exhibits A and B)
over which the Trustees are presently deadlocked.

Also, irrespective of what the collective negotiations
might show, resort to what transpired therein, is unwarranted
and unnecessary because I do not find the statutes to be
ambiguous on the deadlocked issues.

Finally, the statutes expressly deem the Funds to be
"corporations".

In that regard the statutes creating them

are preeminent and controlling:

-6"Corporations necessarily depend both for
their powers and the mode of exercising them
upon the construction of the statute which gives
them life and being." (Lyons First National Bank
v. Ocean National Bank 60 N.Y. 278, 19 Am. Rep. 181.)

Within the statutes creating the Funds, to which I rule
I am limited and bound, and with the exception of the employment of an independent actuary, I find the proposed regulation
of the Unions' Trustees to be legal.

By their terms, Chapter 877, Articles 5 and 6 of the Laws
of New York and the identical legislation passed by the state
legislature, are neither generally nor explicitly conditioned
by or subject to any of the other provisions of the Administrative Code or City Charter referred to in the brief of the
City Trustees.

The enabling legislation and Chapter 877 post-

dated most if not all of the Administrative Code and Charter
provisions cited.

It seems to be that had it been intended

to condition or subject

the statutes establishing

these Funds

on or to other provisions of the Code or Charter, they would
and should have so provided explicitly,

Such conditions and

limitations were well within the contemplation of the drafters
of the legislation establishing the Funds, and the possibility
of a conflict between the legislation and any pre-existing
part of the Administrative Code or Charter was similarly foreseeable.

Hence as I see it, the laws establishing the Funds

are entitled to stand on their own and are not subject to
limitations not contained therein and not incorporated by
reference.

-7Chapter 877, Articles 5 and 6, Sections 19-44.0 and B1964.0 respectively established the Funds as "corporations".

The

pertinent part of these sections read:

The variable supplements Fund shall have the
powers and privileges of a corporation
I find this to be a broad, explicit and unrestricted
statutory grant of authority to the Funds and to the Trustees
thereof.

The word "corporation" is in no way qualified.

Had

the drafters intended it be a "corporation" limited to the frame
of a "city agency" they had ample opportunity to so provide,
but did not.

Had they intended the Funds, as

"corporations",

to have powers and privileges different from a traditional
corporation whether public or private, they could have so provided, but did not.

At least in those Sections there is no condition, limitation or restraint on the traditional exercise of corporate
power and privileges by the Funds.

I do not think it can be seriously disputed that the traditional powers of a corporation include those things set forth in
the proposed resolution of the Unions' Trustees (Exhibit A).
In the furtherance of corporate purposes corporations may:
Elect or appoint officers, employees and other
agents of the corporation, define their duties,
fix their reasonable compensation, and the reasonable compensation of Directors and to indemnify
corporate personnel. Such compensation shall be
commensurate with services performed. (See McKinney's
Consolidated Laws of New York annotated - Public
Corporations.)

-8It is fundamental that a broad, unconditional grant of
power and authority, such as set forth in Section B 19-44.0
and B 19-64.0 may be narrowed or limited only by explicit exceptions set forth or referred to in the same law.

Chapter

877, Articles 5 and 6 are consistent with this fundamental
rule of legislative intent and interpretation.

The statutes

dk) contain some explicit limitations on what the Funds can do
as corporations.

But these explicit exceptions do not include

the exercise of the power sought by the Unions' Trustees.
is significant.

This

The drafters of the legislation had the

opportunity, and indeed took the opportunity to statutorily
restrict the corporate powers of the Funds in certain specific
areas.

Yet, other powers, well within their knowledge and

contemplation, which could have just as easily been included as
exceptions to the powers of the Fund, were not.

One can only

conclude that the Funds were not to be restricted by the unspecified restrictions.

Or in the alternative, based on fund-

amental statutory interpretation, unspecified restrictions cannot now be read into the statutes.
Specifically and by example the statutes oust the Funds
from selecting an independent actuary, by providing that the
actuary of the Funds shall be the actuary appointed by the
Board of Estimate.

The statutes also preclude compensation

to the Trustees and to "employees assigned to the Board of
Trustees".

The statutes name the Comptroller of the City as

-9the custodian of the Funds, so that an independent custodian
is proscribed.

There are other express changes in the general

power of a "corporation", but I find none prohibiting what the
Unions' Trustees seek by their proposed resolution. (Exhibit A).

The statutes do not prohibit the Funds, through the Trustees,
from exercising the corporate power and privilege to employ
"legal assistance".

The contention of the City Trustees that

the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York must be the
Counsel to the Funds is nowhere found in the statutes.

An

independent actuary is barred; why does not the legislation
expressly bar independent counsel? The City Trustees answer
inferentially.

They contend that the Funds are "City Agencies"

because they are supported financially from the City Treasury
and that the Charter mandates the Corporation Counsel as Counsel
to all City agencies.

Based on the fundamental rule of statu-

tory constructions, namely that a broad statutory grant of unrestricted power may be limited only by an equally explicit
exception, I cannot find that this multi-step inferential
reasoning, unsupported by any explicit language in the statutes
creating the Funds overturns, modifies or restricts the powers
of the Trustees pursuant to sections B 19-44.0 and B 19-64.0 to
employ legal counsel.

I find nothing in the statutes which prohibits the
Trustees from employing administrative or expert assistants
provided such reference in Exhibit A means persons of professional

-10or special skill.

Sections B 19-42.0 f and B 19-62.0 f which

read:
The Fire Commissioner shall assign to the Board
such number of clerical and other assistants as
may be necessary for the performance of its
finances ./r^H ^ c. J\ s ^
are not a bar.
I interpret the emphasis of the foregoing to be on the
word clerical.

The reference to "other assistants" means, in

my judgement, persons on the same level, with the same basic
standing as clerical employees.

Had these sections been in-

tended to foreclose employment of experts or professionals
skilled in the management and/or administration of Funds, I
am sure the drafters would have said so.

Instead they used

first the word "clerical" followed by the phrase "other
assistants".

Under the interpretive rule of ejusdem generis,

the first word sets the class and type.

General references

thereafter are confined to that class and type. Hence the
phrase "other assistants" cannot mean personnel of expert skill
or professional standing who are employed in key policy implementing posts.

In my view those sections were included so that,

without expense, the Funds could be ministerially manned on
the clerical level by persons assigned by the Fire Commissioner,
but I do not find those sections, either by language or intent,
to foreclose the Trustees from employing, for example, a
professional administrator or other personnel or recognized
professional skill.

-11Nor is such barred by Sections B 19-48.0 and B 19-68.0.
Prohibition of payment for service therein applies to the
Trustees (and that is undisputed) and to "employees assigned
to the Boards".

The latter reference obviously covers only

those employees assigned to the Board by the Fire Commissioner
under Sections B 19-42.0 f and B 19-62.0 f in order to foreclose the payment of double salaries.
For all the foregoing reasons and without again repeating
them, I find no legal prohibition to the adoption of the balance
of Exhibit A.
Accordingly, the Undersigned as the Arbitrator designated
pursuant to Sections B 19-42.0d and B 19-62.0d of the Administrative Code and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties, makes the following Award:
The resolution proposed by the Unions'
Trustees and marked as Exhibit A, except as to the appointment of an
"actuary", is a proper exercise of the
corporate powers and privileges of the
Funds within the meaning of Sections B
19-44.0 and B 19-64.0 of the Administrative Code.
Accordingly the proposed regulation as
set forth in Exhibit A shall be adopted
by the Boards of Trustees of said Funds.

ErieJ.Schmertz
Arbitrator
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DATED: October *- 1972
STATE OF : New York)gs .
COUNTY OF: New York)
On this w
day of October, 1972 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

PUBLIC, STATE OF NEYM
No. 30-883a7^5
Qualified in Nassau County
: Expires March 30, 1973

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers
Local 119, IUE, AFL-CIO

Opinion
and
Award

and
General Electric Company

The Undersigned, having been designated as the Arbitrator
under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the above
named parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of said parties, renders the following Opinion and Award:
Based on the record I cannot find that the Company
contractually, constructively, or effectively changed the regular shift hours of the grievants during
the period September 27 - 30, 1971. The Union was
not notified; no formal or written change of schedule was promulgated; and the evidence on what the
foreman and the grievants discussed orally does not
support the Company's position. Accordingly the
hours worked between 3;45 A.M. and 7:45 A.M. on the
days in question were hours worked prior to the beginning of their regular day shift and are to be paid for
at the rate of double time pursuant to Article V Paragraph 7 (a) (2) of the National Agreement.
I am persuaded that when the grievants1 foreman sought
approval from his superior to permit the grievants to
work prior to the beginning of thei r regular shift,
he did so because he knew that work during those hours
(rather than at the end of a regular shift which he
was authorized to arrange)carried more premium pay, and
that specific authorization of a superior was necessary.
Manifestly had the foreman intended to change the grievants1 regular shift hours to commence at 3:45 A.M.,
approval of a work schedule commencing several hours
before what had been the grievants' regular shift would
be superfluous.
Moreover the fact that the foreman each day ascertained not only the rate of progress on the work but also
whether the grievants would again report for work
early on the following day, is obviously inconsistent

- 2 with any conclusion that the grievants' regular
work schedule had been effectively changed to
commence at 3:45 A.M.
Accordingly Messrs. Jack DeLong and Louis Fagnano
are entitled to double time for the hours worked
from 3:45 A.M. to 7:45 A.M. on the days in question
and the Company is directed to make appropriate
adjustments in their pay.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

_2_ Cf
DATED: December "' f 1972
STATE OF New York )ss>.
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 2-*? day of December, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case No. 1430 1412 72 H
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IUE Local 119
Award

and

and
Opinion

General Electric Company

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Company violated Article VI Section
5 (c) (1) of the 1970-1973 G.E0-IUE National
Agreement when E? Taylor was upgraded to Grade 7
Ordering Clerk rather than S. Greer?
A hearing was scheduled on July 20, 1972 under the expedited arbitration provisions of the Agreement between the above
named Company and Union.

Representatives of both sides and

Miss Greer, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The par-

ties filed post hearing briefs.
I find that employee E. Taylor who is junior in seniority
to the grievant, was selected instead of the grievant because
she occupied a job only one grade below the Grade 7, Ordering
Clerk promotional opportunity.

I find that the grievant was

denied the promotion, not because she lacked the basic qualifications, but because she occupied a Grade 5 job, two steps
below.
I find nothing in Article VI Section 5 (c) (1) which gives
priority to employees one grade below the open position over

- 2 qualified and more senior employees more than one grade below.
That contract section requires, to the extent practical, consideration to present employees, who are qualified and further,
with consideration to their seniority.

As I see it, the phrase

"present employees" does not limit or accord priority to employees only one grade below the promotional opening.

If the

intent was to first screen the qualifications and seniority of
employees only within the job grade immediately below, the contract would and should have so provided.

That it does not,

means in my judgment, that before the Company fills a vacancy
with a new hire, it is to consider the qualifications and seniority of more than just those employees occupying jobs one step
below the job opening,,
In the instant case based on the evidence, and particularly
the job description I find that the grievant who worked in the
same department as Taylor, possessed at least the minimum qualifications to be given an opportunity to fill the job opening
of Grade 7 Ordering Clerk.

And with seniority greater than that

of Taylor, she should have been awarded the upgradea
Nor do I find that the foregoing conclusion is overturned
by any acceptance of or acquiescence by the Union in any practice to the contrary.

Based on the testimony, I am satisfied

that the chart entitled "Salaried Job Classification Relationships" (Company Exhibit No.2), upon which the Company strongly
relies in this proceeding, was negotiated with and accepted by
the Union for layoffs, not for job promotions.

Therefore, that

it concededly is a negotiated "job or occupation track" does
not mean that the Union agreed to it for the purpose for which

- 3 it was used in the instant case.
Accordingly the Undersigned, having been duly designated
in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement between the parties
dated July 29, 1971 (Expedited Procedures) and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the parties makes the following Award:
The Company violated Article VI Section 5 (c) (1)
of the contract when it selected E. Taylor rather
than S. Greer for the job of Grade 7 Ordering
Clerk. Miss Greer shall be upgraded to that job
and made whole for the difference in wages.

Eric J/'Schmertz
Arbitrator

August 7, 1972
Case No. 1430 0495 72

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
!

International Union of Electrical,
Radio & Machine Workers, Local 438
AFL-CIO
and

General Electric Company
Springfield, New Jersey

'
'
'
i
'
i
'
'

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named parties, and dated 1970-1973 and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the parties, Awards, as follows:
As to those of the 24 identified employees laid off
for a two week period beginning August 30, 1971, who
returned from that layoff to the job classification
they held when the layoff commenced, the Company did
not violate Article XI Section 5 of the 1970-1973
GE-IUE National Agreement.
As to those of the 24 identified employees who upon
their return to active employment at the end of the
aforesaid two week period did not resume the jobs they
held at the time of the layoff, but were transferred
or assigned to other job classifications, the Company
violated Article XI Section 5 unless said employees
were given "one week's notice and one week's work at
the prevailing schedule,"or one week's pay in lieu
thereof. If they were not accorded the notice and work
prescribed by Article XI Section 5, or not paid one
week's pay in lieu thereof, the Company shall pay them
one week's pay for the contract breach.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED:
STATE OF New York )ss.:
COUNTY OF New York)
On this
day of
1972, before me
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and
to be the individual described in and who executed
going instrument and he acknowledged to me that he
the same.
Case No. 1830 0057 72

personally
known to me
the foreexecuted

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio & Machine Workers, Local 438
AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

General Electric Company
Springfield, New Jersey
The stipulated issue is;
Did the Company violate Article XI Section 5
of the 1970-73 GE-IUE National Agreement when
24 identified employees were laid off for a
two week period beginning August 30, 1971 without being given one week's advance notice?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Union, New Jersey on June 6, 1972
at which time representatives of the above named parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
ties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.

The par-

Both sides filed

post hearing briefs and the hearings were declared closed as of
November 1, 1972.
Article XI Section 5 of the contract reads:
Employees will be given at least one week's
notice and one week's work at the prevailing
schedule before layoffs are made due to decreasing forces.
The narrow question in this arbitration is whether the
layoff referred to in the stipulated issue was "due to decreasing forces" or constituted a "decrease in forces" within the
meaning of Article XI Section 5.

The Union contends that any

layoff, whether temporary, permanent or of an indefinite period,
is due to or results in a "decrease of forces," entitling the
affected employees to the notice and work prescribed by the

- 2 foregoing contract clause.
The Company contends that Article XI Section 5 is not
applicable to "temporary" layoffs of two weeks or less.
Under other circumstances I believe a case could be made
out that a temporary layoff as well as one of a longer or
permanent duration is "due to decreasing forces" or results in
"a decrease in force."

But the circumstances in the instant

case compel a contrary conclusion, and support the Company's
position.
Article XI Section 5 has been in successive contracts,
unchanged, for a considerable number of years if not from the
inception of the collective bargaining relationship.

The

record before me discloses that for upwards of 20 years there
has been a consistent and unvaried practice, corporate-wide,
-

to exclude layoffs of two weeks or less from the application
of that contract provision.

That practice has been followed

at the Springfield plant as well.
prompted grievances from the Union.
pursue them to arbitration.

Two prior similar instances
But the Union did not

Also between 1960 and 1966 a

Local Supplemental Agreement entered into between this Local
Union and the Company at the Springfield location provided
expressly for the exclusion from Article XI Section 5 of
"temporary layoffs" and defined a "temporary layoff" as "existing for a limited time only ... (not) in excess of two weeks
(14 calendar days.)}' This is not to say that the aforementioned practice, grievance disposition, or Local Supplemental
Agreement are conclusive per se, but rather that they are con-

- 3 trolling in the absence of evidence of a contrary agreement
or a different practice, interpretation or intent„
There is no such countervailing evidence.

The Union has

not pointed to a single instance in which a layoff of two
"weeks or less has been subject to the notice and work provisions of Article XI Section 5.

The Union is correct when it

asserts that the "corporate-wide" practice has been based on
Local Supplemental Agreements entered into by other IUE local
Unions at other Company installations to which this Local Union
and this Company location are not parties.

Yet the issue be-

fore me involves the interpretation of a particular section
of the GE-IUE National Agreement. While this Local Union is not
necessarily bound by what other locals negotiate on a Local
Supplement basis, the Local Supplemental Agreements elsewhere
are obviously relevant to a determination of what the International Union (and other constituent local Unions thereof)
and the Company have agreed to, intended, or permitted with
regard to the application and interpretation of Article XI
Section 5.

Hence that evidence is clearly material to how

Article XI Section 5 of the National Agreement should be interpreted, especially where there is no applicable Local
Supplemental Agreement.
A Local Supplemental Agreement between this local Union
and the Company's Springfield installation which expressly provided for a different interpretation or application of Article
XI Section 5 would preempt a bare interpretation of the Agreement on a National level and what other local Unions and the

- 4Company are doing elsewhere.

But at present there is no such

effective Local Supplemental Agreement, and the last Local
Supplemental Agreement effective between 1960 and 1966 was consistent with the Company's position in this case0
As I observed at the hearing the 1960-1966 Local Supplemental Agreement, having expired in 1966, is not now binding.

But

absent a different practice thereafter, or a different agreement,
or some evidence of a different intent or interpretation of
Article XI Section 5, there continues at least a presumption
that the parties have not changed the way that clause is to be
interpreted and administered.

I find nothing in this record

between the years 1966 and the present to rebut that presumption.
Accordingly I find and hold that a layoff of two weeks or
less, with notice of that limited period of time at the outset
of the layoff, is a "temporary layoff" and not a layoff "due
to decreasing forces" within the meaning of Article XI Section
5 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Hence, affected em-

ployees are not entitled to the advance notice required under
Article XI Section 5.
However, I am not persuaded that the layoffs of all of
the 24 grievants were limited to two weeks within the foregoing interpretation.

The Company concedes that if a layoff

from a particular job classification is to be for a period
longer than two weeks, the affected employee is not only given
the notice and work prescribed by Article XI Section 5, but
may exercise his seniority rights to bump into some other job

- 5 classification.

Based on the evidence I am satisfied that

some of the grievants fell into this latter category. At the
initiation of the layoff the Company knew that a lack of work
in that particular job classification might well last up to
one month.

The cut-back in work was due to a directive from a

customer that the schedule of his work be held up one month.
In my judgment that created a strong probability that some of
the grievants would not be able to return from the layoff at
the end of two weeks to the job classification they previously
held.

Subsequent events bore this out.

It appears that some

of the 24 grievants, upon return from the two week layoff, were
transferred to other job classifications because there was not
enough work for all of them in the jobs from which they were
laid off.

As a result, those grievants were laid off from

their original job classifications for more than two weeks two weeks out of the plant plus a period of time thereafter
when transferred or assigned to a different joba
As I see it the Company knew or should have known that
those employees would be laid off and/or displaced from their
regular job classification for more than two weeks, and hence
their layoffs, even under the Company's interpretation, exceeded fourteen calendar days.

They should have been afforded

the notice and work benefits of Article XI Section 5.
The record is unclear as to whether those particular
grievants were accorded the benefits of Article XI Section 5
at the time they returned to active employment after fourteen
days and when transferred to other jobs.

If they were, there

- 6 has been no breach of Article XI Section 5.

If not, those

particular grievants are entitled to the remedy which the
Union seeks, namely one week's pay in lieu of one week's notice and one week's work at the prevailing schedule.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
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and
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The Company contends that due to an error Ernest LaBracca
and James Haviland were overpaid in wages.

The Company seeks

recoupment.
In the case of LaBracca the Company seeks the right to recover the overpayment by making deductions from his wages.

In

the case of Haviland the Company deducted what it claims he
owes from his severance pay upon his recent retirement.

The

Company seeks affirmation of the right to have done so.
Factually the LaBracca case is on all fours with the facts
in Case No. 69-A 27, Local 702, Motion Picture Film Technicians
and Movielab, Inc.

Hence my Award in that case, namely that the

Company is entitled to repayment by the employee of the amount
of wages overpaid him, is applicable to the instant case.
However, in the instant case, unlike its position in Movielab
the Union advanced the defense among others, that Section 193 of
the Labor Law of the State of New York allows only certain specified deductions from an employee's wages.
for overpayment of wages is not among them.

And that deductions
The Union argues

that Section 193 thereby bars the Company from making deductions
from Mr. LaBracca1s wages to liquidate the amount of overpayment.

- 2 I need not interpret Section 193 of the Labor Law, because I am satisfied that repayment to the Company can be
achieved without the Company unilaterally making deductions
from Mr. LaBracca's wages.

I rule that Mr. LaBracca's proper

rate of pay was as a Shipper (c).

I do not find that he was

either classified as or performed the duties of Head Shipper
(d), nor, because he was not a Shipper, Checker and Packer (b)
was he entitled to a 5% wage increase for "foreign shipments."
I find accordingly that he was overpaid by the Company in the
amount of $778.70.
Company.

He owes that total amount of money to the

The Company shall not unilaterally make deductions

from his wages.

Instead I direct that he and/or the Union on his

behalf arrange with the Company a mutually agreeable method of
repayment together with the other considerations to which I
made reference in my Movielab Award,

However if the parties

are unable to agree upon a method of repayment within twenty
days from the date of this Award, the matter may be referred
back to me for determination as to how repayment is to be made.
The Haviland case is different.

Based on the evidence

before me I am persuaded that Mr. Haviland had reasonable
grounds to believe that the work he performed, namely "Jiffy
Tests," were "Reprints" and higher classified work.

And that

after performing that particular work for the requisite contractual period of time, he had reasonable grounds to apply
for a permanent upward reclassification.
Mr. Havialnd was told by his steward that Jiffy Tests
entitled him to a (c) Positive Joining Department rate.

For

thirteen weeks he performed that work and noted it as "reprint"

- 2 on his card.

He was paid at the higher rate without the Company

questioning it.

Thereafter, consistent with the contract, he

applied for and was reclassified upward to the (c) rate, again
without question, refutation or inquiry by the Company, and
was paid at the higher rate for almost two years up to his retirement.
To my mind this is persuasive evidence of the reasonableness of Mr. Haviland's belief- that he was properly paid the
higher rate for the Jiffy Test work and was entitled to a permanent upward adjustment in his wage rate.
correct in fact is immaterial.

Whether he was

For it seems to me that after

the first thirteen weeks, at the point that he was officially
reclassified upward, or within a reasonable time thereafter
the Company had the opportunity and should have protested or
eliminated the higher payment or at least looked into the bonafides of the upward reclassification it made.

That it did not

means to my mind that the disputed work was higher rated, or
if not, by failing to take steps to correct the wage payment
for such an extended period of time it acquiesced in Mr. Haviland's reasonable belief that he was being properly paid.
Accordingly the Company did not have the right to deduct
$345.70 from Mr. Haviland's severance pay upon retirement. The
Company is directed to return to Mr. Haviland that sum of money.
The Undersigned as Permanent Arbitrator under the Collective Agreement between the above parties and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of the paties, makes the following
AWARD:

- 4 Ernest LaBracca owes the Company a total of $778.70
in over payment of wages. He and/or the Union on
his behalf and the Company shall work out a mutually
agreeable method of repayment together with the details of any tax effect. Failing to do so within
twenty days from the date of this Award the matter
may be referred back to me for determination of how
repayment is to be made.
James Haviland was not overpaid in wages by the Company. Accordingly the Company did not have the right
to deduct $345.70 from his severance pay upon retirement. The Company shall return that sum of money to
him.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be shared equally by the
parties.

Eric jfSchmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: October 30, 1972
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York)
On this 30th day of October, 1972, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
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